Encirclement in 1941. Vyazemsky "cauldron" - a little-known page in the history of the war
One of the worst disasters Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War, is considered the defeat of the Bryansk Front and the formation of the Vyazemsky "boiler" during the German operation "Typhoon".
Destruction missions Soviet armies in the Moscow direction were designated in Directive No. 35 of September 6, 1941 of the Wehrmacht High Command, signed by Adolf Hitler. The Soviet forces planned to break up before the onset of winter. They were going to solve this goal by a double encirclement in the general direction of Vyazma - Mozhaisk - Moscow, in the presence of powerful strike groups on the flanks (in the north and south, to cover the capital). On September 16, a directive appeared from the command of the Army Group (GA) "Center" on the preparation of an operation to capture the capital of the USSR, code-named "Typhoon". The German command planned strikes by large groups that concentrated in the areas of Dukhovshchina (3rd Panzer Group of Colonel General Hermann Goth), Roslavl (4th Panzer Group of Colonel General Erich Göpner) and Shostka (2nd Panzer Group of Colonel General Heinz Guderian), surround the main forces of the Soviet troops opposing them and liquidate them in the regions of Bryansk and Vyazma. After that, with a swift march to bypass the capital of the Union from the north and south.
On September 24, the last operational meeting of all the commanders of the infantry armies, tank groups took place, with the participation of Halder and Brauchitsch. On September 26, an offensive order was issued. The order stated that the 4th Field Army and the 4th Panzer Group should strike on both sides of the Roslavl-Moscow highway, then advancing along the line of the Smolensk-Moscow highway, close the ring around Vyazma. Their actions were supplemented by the offensive of units of the 9th Field Army and the 3rd Panzer Group. Their mobile units were to leave east of the upper reaches of the Dnieper and connect with units of the 4th Panzer Group. Parts of the 4th and 9th armies, which were located between the shock groups, were supposed to tie down the Soviet forces in the Yartsevo-Yelnya area.
On the southern wing, the 2nd field army received the task of advancing in the direction of Sukhinichi - Meshchovsk, bypassing Bryansk from the northwest. The 2nd Panzer Group was to advance on Sevsk - Orel, in cooperation with the forces of the 2nd Army, to surround and destroy Soviet troops in the Bryansk region.
The "last decisive battle" was going to start on September 28 and complete Operation Typhoon and the entire campaign (the main fighting) until mid-November 1941. The idea was grandiose - 3 tank groups, 3 armies were concentrated in one operational direction, by the beginning of October the number of GA "Center" was 1.9 million people. It had 78 divisions (including 14 armored and 8 motorized), approximately 1700-2000 tanks, 14 thousand guns and mortars. Air support was provided by the 2nd Air Fleet of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, it had up to 1320 aircraft (420 fighters, 720 bombers, 40 attack aircraft and 120 reconnaissance aircraft).
Soviet forces
The Moscow direction was defended by the Western, Bryansk, Reserve fronts. The Western Front, under the command of Colonel General Ivan Konev, occupied a defense zone of about 300 km, along the line Andreapol - Yartsevo - west of Yelnya. In the first echelon, the defense was held by: the 22nd Army of Commander V. A. Yushkevich (Ostavshkovsky direction), the 29th Army of General I. I. Maslennikov (direction to Rzhev), the 30th Army of Commander V. A. Khomenko and part of the formations 19th Army of General M.F. Lukin (Sychev direction), 16th Army of K.K. Rokossovsky and 20th Army of Commander F.A. Ershakov (Vyazma). Total in the composition Western front there were 30 rifle divisions, 1 rifle brigade, 3 cavalry divisions, 28 artillery regiments, 2 motorized rifle divisions, 4 tank brigades. There were 475 tanks at the front (new T-34s - 51, KV - 19 units).
In the rear of the Western Front and partly on its left flank were the orders of the Reserve Front (commander Marshal S. M. Budyonny). The front included 6 armies: the 24th Army of Major General K.I. Rakutin, the 43rd Army of Commander P.P. Four armies: 31st Army of Major General V.N. Dalmatov, 49th Army of Lieutenant General I.G. Zakharkin, 32nd Army of Major General S.V. Vishnevsky, 33rd Army of Brigade Commander D.N. Onuprienko, stood in the second echelon on the Rzhev-Vyazma defensive line behind the Western Front. In total, the Reserve Front had 28 rifle, 2 cavalry divisions, 27 artillery regiments, 5 tank brigades. In the first echelon there were 6 rifle divisions and tank brigades in the 24th Army, 4 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades in the 43rd Army.
The forces of the Bryansk Front were led by Colonel General Andrey Eremenko. The front closed 330 km in the Bryansk-Kaluga and Oryol-Tula directions. The 50th Army of Commander M.P. Petrov covered the road to Kirov and Bryansk, the 3rd Army of Major General Ya.G. Kreizer closed the Trubchev direction, the 13th Army of Major General A.M. the task force of Major General A. N. Ermakov - the Kursk direction. In total, the Bryansk Front had 25 infantry, 4 cavalry divisions, 16 artillery regiments, 1 tank division, 4 tank brigades. It should be noted that the divisions were not fully staffed, so in the 50th army the number of rifle divisions was approximately 8.5 thousand people, in the 3rd and 13th armies 7.5 thousand each, in the cavalry divisions there were 1.5-2 thousand people. A similar situation was in parts of the Western and Reserve fronts. The Bryansk Front had 245 tanks (including 22 KV and 83 T-34).
Total population The forces of all three fronts numbered 1.2 million people, 10.5 thousand guns and mortars, and about 1 thousand tanks. The air forces of the three fronts numbered 548 combat aircraft (265 fighters, 210 bombers, 36 attack aircraft, 37 reconnaissance aircraft). After the start of the battle, the Air Force was reinforced with 368 long-range bombers and 432 Moscow air defense fighter aircraft. Thus, the Soviet Air Force was not inferior in strength to German aviation.
The operational plans of the Soviet troops in the western direction provided for the conduct of defense along almost the entire front. So on September 10, the Headquarters ordered the Western Front to go on the defensive, "dig into the ground" and allocate 6-7 divisions to the reserve, at the expense of secondary directions, in order to create a powerful maneuverable grouping. The Komfront Konev allocated 4 rifle, 2 motorized rifle, 1 cavalry divisions, 4 tank brigades and 5 artillery regiments to the reserve. A lot of work was done to prepare the defense, it was carried out under the supervision of the General Staff. Deputy Chief of the General Staff A. M. Vasilevsky warned on September 18 that the Germans were preparing a strike in the Yartsevo and Elninsk directions. On September 27, by the directive of the Headquarters, the troops of the Western Front were ordered to go on a rigid defense, only active reconnaissance operations and private offensive operations.
It was assumed that the Germans would strike the main blow along the highway, along the Smolensk-Yartsevo-Vyazma line, in the zone of the 16th Rokossovsky Army. A fairly dense defense was created here, so the 112th Rifle Division defended a front of 8 km (10 thousand people, 38 guns and mortars, 226 machine guns), the neighboring 38th Rifle Division occupied a front of 4 km (10 thousand people, 68 guns and mortars, 202 machine guns). The average staffing of the divisions of the 16th Army was the highest on the Western Front - 10.7 thousand people. In addition, Rokossovsky had 266 guns of 76 mm and above, 32 - 85 mm anti-aircraft guns (to fight tanks), a tank brigade, all other tank formations of the front were under the command of the front headquarters. The 16th army defended a front of 35 km, the neighboring 19th army of Lukin defended 25 km, having 3 divisions in the first echelon and 2 in the second. The 19th Army had 338 guns 76 mm and above, 90 - 45 mm guns, 56 - 85 mm anti-aircraft guns. As a result, not a single Wehrmacht tank division advanced through the 19th Army. It is necessary to take into account the fact that behind the line of defense of the 16th and 19th armies a reserve line was created, it was prepared by the formations of the 32nd Army of the Reserve Front (there were even batteries of naval 130 and 100-mm guns, they covered the highway, the bridge , railway line). It is clear that if the Germans had hit along the highway, they would have suffered serious losses.
But it was simply not possible to cover other dangerous areas so well. Khomenko's 30th Army, which was hit by the main attack of the 3rd Panzer Group, covered a front of 50 km, there were 157 guns of 76-mm and higher caliber for the entire defense line, only one battery of 45-mm cannons, 24 - 85 mm anti-aircraft guns . The army did not have tanks.
The General Staff made a mistake not only in the direction of the main attack, but also in the number of strike groups. It was believed that the Germans would strike in one direction, having only one large tank grouping. Therefore, measures were prepared to repel strikes from a number of other directions. On the Western Front, these were the Ostashkovo-Penovsky, Nelidovo-Rzhevsk, Belsk, Konyutino-Sychevsk, Yartsevo, Dorogobuzh directions.
The Nazis were able to carry out a major regrouping of forces: to transfer the 4th tank group from near Leningrad, and the 2nd tank group of Guderian from the south. Therefore, although the Soviet command quite accurately determined the time of the strike, they made a mistake in strike force enemy, the directions of the main blows. The German 3rd Panzer Group Gotha hit the junction of the 19th and 30th armies, north of the Yartsevo-Vyazma highway. The attack of the 4th Göpner Panzer Group was directed south of the highway, against the 24th and 43rd armies. The 2nd tank group of Guderian hit the orders of the 13th army and the operational group of Ermakov. The Germans were able to create a huge advantage in local areas: for example, 12 German divisions were put up against the 4th divisions of the 30th Army. The 43rd Army - 5 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades, which came under attack from 4 tank groups, held a front of 60 km (3 divisions in the first echelon, 2 divisions and tank brigades in the second). The density of defense is considered optimal - a maximum of 8-12 km per division.
On the Bryansk front, the front command also made a mistake in the direction of the main attack, they were waiting for it in the direction of Bryansk, and the Germans hit 120-150 km to the south.
Bryansk disaster
Heinz Guderian decided to launch an offensive two days earlier than other strike groups in order to take advantage of the support of aviation, which had not yet been used in other directions, and good weather. On September 30, 1941, the 2nd Panzer Group went on the offensive. On October 3, the commander of the Bryansk Front, Eremenko, was going to launch a counterattack on the flanks of the German wedge driven into the defense of the front by the forces of the 13th Army and the Ermakov group. But the forces of the Nazis were underestimated, they believed that a grouping of 1 tank and 1 motorized divisions broke through to Sevsk. And 3 motorized corps went into the breakthrough. Therefore, counterattacks by the forces of the 13th Army (2 rifle divisions), Ermakov's group (3 rifle divisions), were not successful. Already on October 3, the Germans broke into Oryol.
In the evening, the 5th command of the Bryansk Front was allowed to withdraw troops to the second line of defense - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Bryansk and the Desna River. Bryansk was assigned to defend. But already on October 6, the Germans captured Bryansk from the rear. Eremenko gives the order to break through with a fight to the east.
To stop the German advance, reserve units began to be transferred to this sector: from the Reserve Front - the 49th Army, from the Stavka reserve - the 1st Special Guards Rifle Corps of Dmitry Lelyushenko (5th and 6th Guards Rifle Divisions, 4th Tank brigade of Colonel Mikhail Katukov, 11th Tank Brigade of Colonel P. M. Arman, 6th Reserve Aviation Group). In addition, 4 long-range aviation divisions and the 81st special purpose air division were thrown against Guderian's tank group. They also sent the 7th Guards Rifle Division (it was given a tank brigade) to the Kursk direction, which they originally wanted to send to the Crimea. Guards Corps and 7th Guards Division original plan, were supposed to release the encircled troops of the Bryansk Front. At the same time, Tula began to prepare for defense.
While the reserves were transferred over railways, and parts of the Bryansk Front made their way from the encirclement, it was necessary to stop the German offensive in the Tula direction. The 5th Airborne Corps (two brigades, a total of 6,000 fighters) was airlifted to the area of Orel and Mtsensk. On October 3, the corps received an order to transfer and fought until October 20, when it was replaced. The battles for Mtsensk became the finest hour of Katukov's tank brigade, which was able to defeat the German 4th Panzer Division (the command of the division neglected reconnaissance and security and ran into a sudden blow from the brigade). Aviation operated quite successfully, so on October 10, up to 80 enemy aircraft were destroyed at the Oryol-Zapadny airfield (almost all on the ground).
In general, the Bryansk Front was defeated, the forces of the 3rd, 13th and 50th Soviet armies were surrounded. But they could not be taken into a tight ring and completely destroyed, significant forces broke through, during the retreat the commander of the 50th Army, Major General M.P. Petrov, was killed, and Eremenko was seriously wounded.
Vyazma
On October 2, 1941, the offensive of other German tank shock groups began. Göpner's 4th Panzer Group struck at the junction of the 43rd and 50th armies (60 km front). At 6 o'clock in the morning, after a 4-minute artillery preparation, the offensive began. An important role was played by the German Air Force, which prevented the transfer of army reserves to the breakthrough site. At first, the Germans advanced along the Warsaw highway, then turned to Vyazma.
At the same time, units of the 3rd Panzer Group Gotha were advancing (since October 5, 1941, it was headed by General Georg Reinhardt). The Germans hit at the junction of the 30th and 19th armies - a 45 km section of the front. In the first echelon, all the 3rd tank divisions of the German TG advanced. On the very first day, the Germans broke through the defenses in the Dukhovshchina and Roslavl directions, wedged into the defense of the Soviet troops for 15-30 km. October 3 Promotion Depth German units in the strip of the Western Front was up to 50 kilometers, and the Reserve Front - up to 80 kilometers.
Our troops launched a counterattack, for this they formed a group of I.V. Boldin (1 rifle, 1 motorized rifle division, 2 tank brigades). Boldin's operational group struck on October 4-5 in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area. took place tank battle. At the same time, Army Commander Rokossovsky was to lead the front reserve, for active defense in the Vyazma region, in order to stop the second wing of the Germans. But Boldin's group failed to complete the task - the forces were unequal. The German 7th Panzer Division broke through the Dnieper positions of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky line of defense, and then to the highway west of Vyazma. On October 7, the Germans surrounded Vyazma (7th Panzer Division of the 3rd TG and 10th Panzer Division of the 4th TG).
It was one of the darkest days of the terrible 1941. As early as October 4, Konev reported to the Headquarters "about the threat of a large group of Germans entering the rear of our troops." On October 5, this was announced by the commander of the Reserve Front, Budyonny. Parts of the 19th, 20th, 24th, 32nd armies and Boldin's group were surrounded. On October 8, Konev ordered the encircled troops to break through to the Gzhatsk region. The encircled troops fought until October 13, made repeated attempts to break through, but were unsuccessful. So on the 10th, the 20th Army of Lieutenant General F.A. Ershakov went into the breakthrough, the battle was fierce and went on all day. As a result, 5 divisions of the army were completely destroyed (General Ershakov was captured on November 2). On October 11, north of Vyazma, the forces of the 19th and 32nd armies and the group of General Boldin under the command of Commander Lukin tried to break through. Only on the 12th did they manage to make a hole in the German defenses, but it did not work out to strengthen the flanks, the Germans quickly closed the gap, only part of the formations were able to leave. Among the fighters who came out was Boldin.
Results
Encircled near Vyazma, the troops pinned down significant enemy forces intended to pursue the rest of the defeated forces of the Western and Reserve fronts and develop the offensive. Only on October 14, the German command was able to regroup the main forces and on the 15th launch a new general offensive.
German troops broke through the defense line of the Western and Reserve fronts to the entire operational depth, and were able to encircle and destroy a significant part of the forces of the Western and Reserve fronts. The Germans reached the Mozhaisk line of defense of the capital Soviet Union by creating the necessary conditions to continue Operation Typhoon.
The Red Army suffered huge losses, according to a number of data - only more than 600 thousand people were captured. The commander of the 19th Army, Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, and the commander of the 32nd Army, Major General S.V. Vishnevsky, were captured in the Vyazma "boiler", the commander of the 24th Army, Major General K.I. Rakutin, was killed .
Annex 1.
In his memoirs, the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, Vashkevich writes: "... the 2nd Rifle Division received an order from the army commander at 7:30 am on October 11 and began to carry it out. On the Vyazma River, the 1284th (former 5th at the bottom) rifle regiment was left at the disposal of the commander of the 19th army, replacing units of the 1286th rifle regiment.The main forces of the division consisting of the 1282nd, 1286th rifle regiments, a detachment of Black Sea sailors (about 800 people), the 970th artillery regiment, as well as the 596th howitzer artillery regiment attached to the division and 57 The 1st Heavy Artillery Battalion was to take up its starting position to the west, the village of Bogoroditskoye, in order to attack the enemy at 1600. There were 8 hours and 30 minutes left before the start of the attack. units of the division to go 15-18 kilometers to the starting position, artillery to take up firing positions and determine the targets on which to fire, supporting the infantry, the regiment commanders to make a decision and set tasks for the commanders! divisions. The company commanders only had time to show the platoon commanders on the ground where to attack. In order to raise artillery, mortars, heavy machine guns, ammunition, engineering equipment and communications equipment, it was necessary to drain all fuel from transport vehicles into combat vehicles. This event took two or three hours of such severely limited time. By 10 o'clock all orders were given and reports were received that the units had begun to carry them out. The division commander, part of the division headquarters officers, the artillery commander, the divisional engineer and the division's communications chief with communications equipment, the commanders of rifle and artillery regiments at 11:30 arrived at the edge of the forest one and a half kilometers west of Bogoroditsky, where a command post was organized. By one o'clock in the afternoon, the commanders of rifle and artillery regiments received combat missions on the ground and immediately began to solve them. By this time, the 1282nd regiment, the 970th artillery regiment, the 3rd division of the 389th howitzer artillery regiment and part of the 596th howitzer regiment had arrived. The 1286th regiment, part of the 596th howitzer regiment and the 57th heavy artillery battalion were late. A detachment of sailors did not come up yet. Everything was done in a terrible hurry. From 16:00, when the beginning of the attack was set, until dark, there were only about two hours of daylight left. At about 3 pm, the battalions of the 1286th regiment appeared. They ran to their original areas. At about 3:30 p.m., two belated battalions of the 596th howitzer regiment, as well as the 57th heavy artillery battalion, began to deploy. At this time, enemy aircraft became more active. In groups of four to six planes she led to our troops, who occupied or had already taken their starting position for a breakthrough, an attack from the air. Logistic institutions of divisions and the army, pontoon-crossing units flooded into artillery positions, second echelons of regiments and divisions. Communication was interrupted all the time. About all this, and also about the fact that not all of the artillery had yet prepared for action, and that part of the platoons of the 1286th regiment had not yet clarified their tasks, I reported to the commander of the 19th Army, General Lukin. I insistently asked him to postpone the attack until the morning in order to withdraw the rear during the night, put the mixed units in order and establish the disturbed command and control of the troops. To my report and proposal to postpone the offensive until the morning of October 12, I received a response: “Vashkevich, you do not represent the whole situation. Either we will break through today, now, or we will be crushed by morning.” To my remark that the enemy would not launch an offensive at night, General Lukin confirmed: “Go and break through,” and wished me success. With that, we shook hands and parted ways. For direct command of the troops, I, with a small group of staff officers and regimental communications officers, went to the battle formations of the first echelons of the 1286th and 1282nd rifle regiments. I was accompanied by the head of artillery of the division, Colonel Suvorov, and the commissar of the division headquarters, senior political instructor B.Z. Evseev. The division commissar V. T. Krylov and the division chief of staff, Colonel Sofin, remained at the command post. They were supposed to put in order the second echelons of the regiments, mixed with other parts of the army, and then join us. At about 4 p.m., the Katyushas fired their first and last salvo, and all the artillery of the division opened fire. The first echelons of the 1286th and 1282nd rifle regiments went on the offensive. The enemy met our troops with heavy barrage fire. At about 6 pm, already in the dark, parts of the division occupied the village of Pekarevo. Late in the evening they captured the village of Spas and thus broke through the encirclement of the enemy. The breakthrough front reached 3 kilometers. He was shot through with machine-gun and artillery-mortar fire.”
Lukin recalls: "... The commander of the 91st Infantry Division, Colonel I.A. Volkov, is rapidly running up to me:
- Comrade General! The breakthrough has been made, the divisions are leaving, withdraw the army headquarters!
“I will immediately report this to the headquarters of the front. Artillery is introduced into the breakthrough, other formations are pulled up. I.A. I told Volkov that I personally would not go out until I let through all or at least half of the troops.
- Go, withdraw your division, hold the flanks.
He did not have time to catch up with his connection. The circle of encirclement closed again. It was assumed that the enemy managed to bring fresh forces to the breakthrough site and close the breakthrough.
Anyone who was surrounded and found himself in the same position as me will understand my state of mind. No, moral strength was not broken, willpower was not shaken, but I understood the gravity of the situation and could not do anything. He again gathered commanders and commissars. They obviously expected a miracle from me. Well, miracles, as you know, do not happen. A lump came up to the throat ... What words to find? How to help them? Then, pulling himself together, he said: Comrades, the situation is not hopeless. The enemy has concentrated all his forces in the eastern direction and sees that we are torn only in a narrow sector. If we break through south of Vyazma, in the direction of the 20th Army, we will definitely break through. I order you to leave in separate groups."
By dawn on October 12, the units that had broken through were concentrated 18 kilometers northwest of the breakthrough site. Here were units of the 1282nd and 1286th rifle regiments, the 970th artillery regiment and part of the detachment of sailors, as well as units from neighboring army divisions. Physical fatigue and the great tension of the night battle quickly affected. Everyone fell asleep.
Vashkevich: “We spent the whole day on October 12 in this area, waiting for the approach of our other units. However, only separate small units from different divisions of the 19th Army joined us. The 1284th Rifle Regiment, left on the Vyazma River to cover the breakthrough of the 19th Army to the east, completed its difficult task. All day on October 11, he repelled the attempts of large forces with fire and counterattacks. Nazi German troops cross over to the eastern bank of the Vyazma River. The soldiers fought courageously, showed stamina and heroism. Only a small part of the regiment managed to get out of the encirclement and join their troops. Far to the southwest, where fierce fighting had been going on night and morning, there was silence. Attempts to get out of the encirclement, undertaken by the 19th Army on October 8, 9 and 10, only alerted the enemy, forcing him to further condense the battle formations of his troops. The breakthrough from the encirclement, scheduled for 4 pm on October 11, was supposed to be carried out under the cover of night. But for night operations, especially on such a large scale as a breakthrough by the army of large enemy forces and the subsequent night march of 45-55 kilometers, the troops and headquarters turned out to be unprepared.
The losses were so great that the army ceased to exist. 19,000 soldiers died. According to eyewitnesses from the surrounding villages, “... in March 1943, the Germans began to drive us to the vicinity of the village of Martyukhi. Here, along the valley of a small river that surrounded the village, our soldiers lay. There were a lot of them. They were layered on top of each other. We will shoot upper layer, bury, and the next, still frozen, leave until the next day to thaw. So they worked for about a month, buried about seven layers. The Germans were very afraid of epidemics.”
Appendix 2
Here is what the commander of the 45th Cavalry Division Stuchenko wrote about the battles in the area of the villages of Stogovo, Pokrov, Selivanovo: “The ruined land, littered with the corpses of ours and the Germans. There are also warped wagons, tools, machines. Wounded horses, heads down, roam the dead field. And there is an ominous silence around ... On October 13, the army troops began to split into separate groups for an independent exit. All the guns were blown up, the cars were burned. But no one raised a hand to destroy the horse train. The horses were dispersed through the forest. "The Germans could not hold back the last desperate onslaught of Soviet soldiers from the northern part of the" boiler "in the south direction. On the night of October 12-13, a significant part of them, as a result of heavy and bloody battles, were able to break through However, there they ended up in the same environment - only now it's the 4th german army. On October 13, the area around the Smolensk-Vyazma highway was cleared. The Soviet troops stopped organized resistance. The picture of the completed battle was truly tragic. An officer from the headquarters of the 8th AK conveyed his impressions of what he saw then in a report prepared for the command of the formation. It says: “... Frost came and the first snow fell. Endless streams of Russian prisoners walked along the highway to the west.
The corpse fields near the centers of the last battles were full of horror. Everywhere there were masses of saddled horses, property, guns, tanks were lying around.
Stuchenko writes about his exit from the "cauldron": "The 45th cavalry division on October 12 at 2300 received an order from the army commander: to hold the front until 4 o'clock in the morning, and then retreat to the south, covering the troops that will be at dawn break through to the Stogovo region (south of Vyazma) to join with the 20th Army of Lieutenant General Yershakov. However, as it turned out later, the army headquarters, having put together a detachment of 600 people, took the radio station and left in an unknown direction. It turned out that the division had not actually covered anyone for about 4 hours. At five o'clock in the morning, the regiments, by order of the division commander, withdrew. Keeping their horses on the reins, the cavalry began to move south, as ordered in the evening by the commander. At dawn on October 13, the division approached the village of Zhipino. The patrols sent out were met with fire: there was an enemy in the village. To avoid unnecessary losses, the village was bypassed from the northwest, and then the remnants went through the forest to the village of Bukhanovo. But they did not reach it, falling under machine-gun fire. I had to go back to the village of Gipino and make another attack. Soon, tankers from the 127th Tank Brigade, Major General of the Tank Forces Fyodor Timofeevich Remizov, joined the cavalrymen. True, only 3 KV tanks remained in the brigade, which were soon also shot down. On the way of the division was the Vyazma River, which it was decided to force near the village of Stepankovo. The remnants of the division were imperceptibly supplemented by joined officers and soldiers who left the encirclement. Soon there were already more than 600 of them. But the backbone still consisted of fighters of the 45th Cavalry Division, in which there were still 180 horses at that time, of which only 22 were healthy. Gavronsky, the head of intelligence of the division, died from a wound in the stomach. Soon came to the railway station Pyatnitsa. The unit led by the division commander moved forward, entered the woods north of the Ugra station and settled down to rest. The rest of the detachment, which already represented a rather motley mass spontaneously, disorganized into separate groups, which moved along the shortest directions to the front line. Some of them broke through in the Naro-Fominsk area, and some did not reach their own at all. A group with division commander Stuchenko at noon on October 17 approached the village of Koptevo in the Znamensky district Smolensk region. The Germans were not here. Here they managed to get boats for crossing the river. In the next 8 days, nothing significant happened, except for individual skirmishes with the enemy, mainly on the roads that had to be crossed. On October 26, still before dark, the group approached the village of Kliny (50 kilometers west of Serpukhovo). In the last days of October, southwest of Serpukhov, they managed to capture "tongue", who turned out to be a corporal of the 13th Army Corps. According to his testimony, the further route was determined: Troyanovo - Burinovo - Staiki. There are forests and swamps, and there are fewer enemy troops. The most dangerous section was the road between Burinovo and Voronino, which had to be crossed. Soon, on October 28, the group went to the location of the Soviet troops in the zone of the 49th Army.
Day of joy, congratulations and, of course, memories that the historian, Moscow historian Yuri Nikolaevich Alexandrov shared in an interview:
“I was drafted into the army in 1939 when the war started. By this time I was already at the university and, in fact, I had no other goals than to return to this bench, which I left then. I thought I'd serve two years and come back. But it was naive, because on September 1, Germany attacked Poland. The Second World War began.
I served in Mongolia until 1941. Then a colonel-general came to Mongolia, in my opinion, Gorodovikov, who in appearance resembled Budyonny, who was also at that time on the Western Front. And we were all reoriented to the West. I personally was very happy. By that time, I was in the ranks of our brigade newspaper, and I ended up in the 8th motorized armored brigade. I tried in tank unit fall under the influence of the "Three Comrades". It was a famous film, and, of course, naive, I thought that my place was also in the tank.
We drove west. When we were driving, I thought that it was closer to Moscow, and yet I had already served a year. This is May 1941. When we were approaching Moscow, we did not approach, we were driving in some side way, to the south. And at that time I came across a newspaper in which Lozovsky reported from the Information Bureau that there was no transfer of troops from east to west.
For us, this was complete nonsense, since we were traveling precisely from east to west. Further, until 1941, I was in a military unit as a soldier, I did not want any promotion, because even the junior command staff served for three years, not two. I was counting on two.
Recently, I have already served in our brigade newspaper "For the Motherland". There were three people there, I worked as an editor. Thus began my entry into print. So I have a lot of experience in journalism.
Zhukov confers with commanders. (wikipedia.org)
How did my participation in the Vyazemsky “cauldron” come about? The fact is that there was not one "boiler", there were two of them. We were thrown out of wagons in Osh. The task was to protect Moscow, since we were still part of the personnel. Moreover, I ended up in a unit that participated in Khalkhin Gol under the command of Zhukov, whom I met as an orderly. He came just to us, and I reported to him about our platoon.
After we were dropped off in Osh, we headed along the Minsk highway. There were many episodes here. There were fights. The task was to saddle the highway in order to prevent the Germans from advancing towards Moscow. Here I took part in a very heavy attack, because the Germans had fortified the approaches to the highway and had to be driven out of them. And it was the first attack. I don't even know whether to talk about it or not. It's totally weird. Then I also participated in the attacks, but I just don’t remember this one. There was no such thing.
Why? First of all, because I did not know how to run, although I still imagined that it was better that way. I ran straight to that machine gun...
No, I wasn't stupid. It was just my first fight. And I ran straight to this very machine gunner. And the machine gunner fired like a fan. I was running in some kind of fire triangle. I didn't feel any fear at the time. I didn't try to fall, I just ran straight ahead - I had to take down this machine gunner.
In general, my place was, of course, there, on the Minsk highway. How I got out of there, I don't know. This is destiny. This is the case. We didn't even shoot when we ran. And the rye stood tall, it was difficult to run, entangled in this rye, but still, when we ran closer, they started shooting, and I don’t know who, but we removed the machine gunner and were able to fulfill the order - to saddle this road. In addition, we captured two German officers who brazenly rode, just like in their native Germany. I have not seen this. They just pulled up to the spot where we had already put up a barrier on the highway and turned into the field. Then they raised their hands, and we found very important documents in their car: strategic maps, whole line others. I personally did not see, did not take away their things. Then they came from the Special Department and finished with these people.
Soviet soldiers who were captured near Vyazma. (wikipedia.org)
It was the first "cauldron" from which I came out, or rather swam out, because I had to get out to the other side of the Dnieper. This, apparently, was not far from Dorogobuzh, because when we got there in the evening (it was very late), the coast was almost empty. But it was clear that there was a meat grinder. This immediately caught my eye. Everyone was ordered to get out on their own. I am a Volzhan myself, so for me water is my native element. I took off my boots, took a rifle and the rest of the uniform and swam across the Dnieper. It is narrow there, this is the Solovyovskaya crossing.
Well, and then - Vyazma. Then this terrible funnel sucked us in. The fact is that by this time we had already taken a different disposition, and we had to get out of this second “boiler”, the main one, because it was at that time that the Germans had an order, who hesitated for a while, because Hitler assumed that the main blow should be delivered, as I already know from German documents, to the south, where there were minerals, and the generals of the Central Group believed that it was necessary to move to Moscow, and this, supposedly, would decide the whole war. At this time, I was even given a one-day vacation so that I could go to Vyazma, because my mother was waiting for me there. And it was a date that is difficult to talk about without tears. We didn't see each other for a long time, but that was later.
And we went with this forward detachment to a breakthrough. I went behind, in the rearguard. Ahead were commanders who had a compass, maps. They followed a certain route. I closed this column. And since I probably didn't sleep at all for five or six days, I fell asleep on the go. And when I opened my eyes, it turned out that I was all alone. Then I decided that I would go east. Focused on Big Dipper, polar star.
Walked east. There are quite a few villages there. I was guided by the fact that there were "sounding" villages, where the sounds of the harmonica were heard (which means that there were Germans), and there were "silent" villages. Here I entered one of the "silent" villages.
There was a woman with a baby in her arms. When she saw me, she immediately said: “Get on the stove.” I tried to at least unfold the footcloths: my boot was pierced by a mine, frostbite was already beginning, I fell into a ditch. And as soon as I climbed onto the stove, the door opened and two policemen entered. They were in black uniforms, with white armbands and a fascist badge.
And they took me, dragged me out of this hut and dragged me further. There was a road nearby, where the longest line of prisoners was walking. It was terrible to look at it. They pushed me in there. A few days later we were taken. We spent the night right on the snow. So I ended up in Roslavl, where there was a transit camp for Soviet prisoners of war and civilians dulag-130. What I saw there is indescribable.
Captured Red Army soldiers. (wikipedia.org)
But still I escaped from this camp. Then he again came to the Germans, was in Klintsy. Run again...
And yet I managed to fight on the Soviet side. The fact is that I saw the beginning of the war and saw its end. I must say that I was also in the penal battalion. This is happiness, because I did not end up in the camp. After all, for the fact that you were in German captivity, you were expected ... in general, you turned out to be generally outside the law.
I ended the war by taking Koenigsberg, awarded a medal"For courage." This is the most expensive award that I had during the Patriotic War. After that, I ended up in the hospital. From there we were taken back to Mongolia. So I'm back where it all started. There I also took part in the war with Japan. It was already 1945."
On October 2, 1941, the offensive of the German shock tank groups began in the northern direction towards Moscow. Göpner's 4th Panzer Group struck at the junction of the 43rd and 50th armies. At 6 o'clock in the morning, after a 4-minute artillery preparation, the offensive began. An important role was played by the German Air Force, which prevented the transfer of army reserves to the breakthrough site. At first, the Germans advanced along the Warsaw highway, then turned to Vyazma.
At the same time, units of the 3rd Panzer Group Gotha were advancing.(since October 5, 1941, it was headed by General Georg Reinhardt). The Germans hit at the junction of the 30th and 19th armies- 45 km section of the front. In the first echelon, all the 3rd Panzer Divisions of the German Panzer Group (TG) advanced. On the first day the Germans broke through the defense in the Dukhovshchinsky and Roslavl directions, wedged into the defense of the Soviet troops for 15-30 km. On October 3, the depth of advance of German units in the Western Front was up to 50 kilometers, and the Reserve Front - up to 80 kilometers.
Our troops launched a counterattack, for this they formed a group of I. V. Boldin. The operational group struck on October 4-5 in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area. A tank battle took place. But Boldin's group failed to complete the task - the forces were unequal. The German 7th Panzer Division broke through the Dnieper positions of the Rzhev-Vyazemsky line of defense, and then to the highway west of Vyazma. October 7, the Germans surrounded Vyazma(7th Panzer Division of the 3rd TG and 10th Panzer Division of the 4th TG).
Environment map
It was one of the darkest days of the terrible 1941. As early as October 4, Konev reported to the Headquarters "about the threat of a large group of Germans entering the rear of our troops." On October 5, this was announced by the commander of the Reserve Front, Budyonny. Parts of the 19th, 20th, 24th, 32nd armies and Boldin's group were surrounded. October 8 Konev ordered to break through encircled troops in the Gzhatsk area. The encircled troops fought until October 13, made repeated attempts to break through, but were unsuccessful. So on the 10th, the 20th Army of Lieutenant General F.A. Ershakov went into the breakthrough, the battle was fierce and went on all day. As a result, 5 divisions of the army were completely destroyed (General Ershakov was captured on November 2). On October 11, north of Vyazma, the forces of the 19th and 32nd armies and the group of General Boldin under the command of Commander Lukin tried to break through. Only On the 12th, a breach was made in the German defenses., but it did not work out to strengthen the flanks, the Germans quickly closed the gap, only part of the formations were able to leave. Among the fighters who came out was Boldin.
Results:
- Encircled near Vyazma, the troops fettered significant enemy forces, designed to pursue the rest of the defeated forces of the Western and Reserve fronts, the development of the offensive. Only on October 14, the German command was able to regroup the main forces and on the 15th launch a new general offensive.
- German troops broke through the defense line of the Western and Reserve fronts to the entire operational depth, and were able to encircle and destroy a significant part of the forces of the Western and Reserve fronts. The Germans reached the Mozhaisk line of defense the capital of the Soviet Union, creating the necessary conditions for the continuation of the Typhoon operation.
- The Red Army suffered huge losses, according to a series of data - only captured more than 600 thousand people. The commander of the 19th Army, Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, and the commander of the 32nd Army, Major General S.V. Vishnevsky, were captured in the Vyazma "boiler", the commander of the 24th Army, Major General K.I. Rakutin, was killed .
My friend Alexei Kislitsyn, a representative of the international association of public search movements, has long and successfully worked in the German archive in Germany with documents relating to the Second World War.
I always look forward to hearing from him with great interest. Each piece of news is another previously unknown but now discovered and documented page from military history our city.
This unique documents that we didn't know about before. I hope they will shed light on some historical moments and serve as an occasion for further research on this topic.
Some historians are still arguing how many of our soldiers and officers died in the Vyazemsky boiler in October 1941? How many were taken prisoner?
For me, a big shock was the study of a previously classified document of the German Army Headquarters dated 10/15/1941. This is the "Final report on the position of the enemy in the encirclement near Vyazma." I have never read documents about the war on behalf of the opposite side. I was jarred at the very idea that in the documents someone could call not the Nazis, but our soldiers and officers, enemies.
However, I read this archival German document from seventy-five years ago and found amazing details and facts:
“In a 12-day breakthrough and encircling battle west of Vyazma, the 4th Army with the 4th Panzer Group subordinate to it, in close cooperation with the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group, actively supported by aviation, during the battle and reconnaissance of the Red Army forces completely destroyed a lot of Soviet troops of the Western, Central (Reserve) fronts, consisting of: 16th, 19th, 20th, 24th and 43rd armies, as well as 32nd, 33rd, 49th reserve armies .
In total, destroyed: 45 rifle divisions, 2 tank divisions, 3 tank brigades, 2 cavalry divisions, as well as many army ground formations.
Most of the divisions were forced to surrender at the location of the 4th Army as a result of the active attacking actions of the 9th Army:
332,474 prisoners of war
310 tanks
1653 guns, as well as many anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, grenade launchers, machine guns, vehicles and other equipment were captured as trophies or destroyed.
The destruction of the enemy forces imprisoned in the cauldron near Vyazma is over. All forces were destroyed except for small "burrs" that made their way through the ring to the east. total weight captured equipment is not yet calculable and is collected across the battlefields and forests.
Enemy losses are estimated at a total of 500,000 - 600,000 people, dead, captured and wounded. Many parts fought before last person…
In addition, 53 loaded trains, 7 locomotives, 1 armored train, 2 warehouses with supplies, 1 warehouse with 6 thousand air bombs and 3 food warehouses were captured.
The figures are not final and will be clarified at the end of the cleansing.
In this dry and pedantic document in German, I was surprised exact figure Soviet prisoners of war - 332,474 people. And our losses - dead, captured, wounded - in the number of 500,000 - 600,000 people.
And, of course, I paid special attention to the phrase: "Many units fought to the last man ...". Honor and praise to our valiant Defenders of the Fatherland.
* * *
Again, I draw your attention to the fact that this case Lukin already deserved to be shot before the formation of the army. Both for the actual refusal to try to break out of the encirclement, for the decomposition of military discipline and the unauthorized dissolution of units, and for the failure to comply with the order of the Headquarters on the leadership of a breakthrough from the encirclement by four armies, order No. 270 of August 16, 1941, etc. I personally very much it is difficult to understand one thing - is it really among all commanders not a single more or less decent person was found to immediately shoot Lukin and his entire camarilla as real traitors and traitors to the Motherland ?! Where did the Special Department, the military prosecutor, the military tribunal look?! After all, the lives of a whole million people entrusted to them, and especially the fate of the capital, were at stake!
So the question is whether this is the real, extremely unsightly truth about the true origin of the tragedy of the Vyazemsky "cauldron" was meant by Lukin, who became pretty bold after the assassination of Stalin, who, in the euphoria of victory and due to Lukin's disability - in captivity, his leg was amputated - simply took pity above him and did not put him against the wall ?! Is it not because of this that Lukin so famously shifted all the blame on Konev and Budyonny ?! After all, the most The best way hide your betrayal - shift the blame for the tragedy on others! No one argues that they were to blame, but they were to blame for the oak leadership of the hostilities. But for what happened in the environment, Lukin had to personally answer for this and only at the firing wall. After all, just near Vyazma, 37 divisions, 9 tank brigades, 31 artillery regiments of the High Command reserve and field departments of four armies were ruined! The Germans with only 28 divisions surrounded our 37 divisions, 9 tank brigades, 31 artillery regiments of the High Command reserve and the field departments of four armies! And a few days later, the Teutons left only 14 divisions and our 37 divisions, 9 tank brigades, 31 artillery regiments of the High Command reserve and field departments of four armies meekly, like sheep, surrendered without being defeated! Moreover. Can anyone explain intelligibly, what does Stalin and the Headquarters have to do with it, if the decision expressed in Lukin's order was not even reported to the Headquarters, if Lukin did not find it necessary to answer the last requests of the Headquarters at all ?!
Maybe it's enough with manic fanaticism to blame everything on Stalin and the Stavka?! Maybe it's time, finally, to ask at least something from our "valiant" generals and marshals of the military era?! How much can you slander the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Headquarters and the General Staff, headed by the wisest ace Marshal Shaposhnikov, and make them guilty for any reason, and most often for no reason ?!
Notes:
Halford J. MacKinder. The Round World and the Winning of the Peace. Foreign Affairs, July 1943.
For more details on this issue, see the excellent book, superbly argued by declassified documents of the SVR, GRU, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Stalin Fund, the Comintern and other previously completely unknown documentary materials. Yuri Tikhonov Stalin's Afghan war. Battle for Central Asia". M., 2008.
Lopukhovsky L. Vyazemskaya catastrophe of the 41st year. M., 2007, p. 557.
Mukhin Yu. I. If not for the generals. Problems of the military class. M… 2006. S. 198–204.
bag for vacuum packing.