What was the scorched earth policy? On the issue of scorched earth tactics

Soviet scorched earth tactics include many aspects: military, economic, and many others. In "The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry" (meaning the author's book "The Disappearance of the Jews of Eastern Europe". See "About the author" and about the book at the end of the article - note RH) I have touched only lightly on the subject of the demographic changes of Eastern European Jews. Here I want to focus on the economic side of the Second World War.

The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, provided for the following territorial redistribution: Estonia and Latvia were transferred to the Soviet sphere of interests, and Lithuania fell into the German one./1 After the defeat of Poland, the Soviet government immediately began to put strong pressure on Germany to revise the treaty . In order to keep the peace, Hitler agreed to a second treaty, the so-called Friendship and Boundary Treaty of September 28, 1939, Germany gave up its interests in most of Lithuania in exchange for the area between the Vistula and the Bug with a population of about 3.5 million people, including more than 300,000 Jews./2 This zone was under Soviet occupation for a very short time, but the Red Army destroyed almost the entire agricultural system, taking livestock and agricultural equipment before retreating. As a result, the Germans had to bring food in large quantities to prevent starvation in this agricultural area. / 3 This episode was supposed to be a lesson for Germany, but, unfortunately, it did not.

While Germany was involved in the Western Campaign from May 10 to June 24, 1940, the Soviet Union occupied almost all of Lithuania between June 16 and 22 after the June 15 ultimatum - that is, including even the territory that was supposed to remain within the German borders. areas of interest according to the contract. This occupation is not only a gross violation of two Soviet-German treaties, but also of the Soviet-Lithuanian mutual assistance treaty (October 10, 1939). The German government was not notified of this action./4 Northern Bukovina, one of the areas of Romania that was outside the Soviet interests agreed to in the treaty, was similarly appropriated by the Soviets, although in this case the Soviets pressed Germany to give their "consent "in the ultimatum period of 24 hours before the start of the occupation. I mention these events only because they demonstrate the determination with which the USSR destroyed the German strategic advantage while acquiring their own. They also show that Germany did not have definite military objectives regarding Soviet Union because otherwise it is impossible to imagine that she will have to put up with the Soviet usurpation of the strategically invaluable Lithuanian route to Leningrad and Moscow.

Scorched earth

Faced with a massive build-up of Soviet military power along the border, and alerted by new Soviet demands for unrealistic territorial concessions in Europe, Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The Soviets immediately began to kill German prisoners of war immediately after being captured or after a short interrogation. Even seriously wounded soldiers were not spared. Numerous evidence exists to this effect at the West German Research Institute military history(Militaergeschichtliche Forschungsamt), who is known for his not at all pro-German bias, he estimates the percentage of captured German soldiers who died in Soviet captivity in 1941-1942 at 90-95 percent. / 5A

Within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities, the Central Committee issued an order in the Kremlin for the troops to leave only scorched earth to the enemy. All valuable property was ordered to be destroyed, regardless of the needs of the remaining civilian population. For this, specially created detachments for the destruction of property were used. The aforementioned military research institute commented: “From the very beginning of the war, Stalin and the leadership of the Soviet Union showed through these measures how much they were concerned about this armed conflict with Germany, which for them was of a completely different character than just a “European war”.” /5 B

The measures taken by the Soviet Union in the period from 1940 to 1942 are aimed not only at further development the Soviet war economy, as well as harming the Germans even at the cost of huge losses among Soviet citizens. Soviet scorched earth tactics included the deportation of millions of men, women and children; relocation of thousands of factories; destruction of almost all railway rolling stock; the destruction of most of the agricultural machinery, livestock and grain stocks; systematic destruction, burning and undermining of immovable infrastructure, stocks of all kinds, factory buildings, mines, residential areas, public buildings, state archives, and even cultural monuments; deliberate starvation among the civilian population who remained in the occupied territories. This policy shamelessly used the civilian population as a pawn. This policy is confirmed by so many sources that there can be no different opinions. It is strange that this topic has not yet been covered in the scientific literature. So far, this scorched earth policy has not been explored to the extent it deserves.

Long before the outbreak of the German-Soviet conflict, Stalin began to prepare for a future war in Europe, developing heavy industry in the Urals and Western Siberia, starting with the first five-year plan in 1928. His plans were long term. In the early 1930s, he had already announced his intention to overtake the most industrialized countries no later than June 1941 - the year when, according to numerous testimonies and statements by Soviet leaders, including Stalin's son, the Red Army hit Germany late summer. /7 With the help of thousands of engineers and experts from Europe and North America, the core of the Soviet military industry was established in the region where Europe meets Asia. Millions of Soviet citizens were ruthlessly sacrificed in the quest to achieve military superiority of the USSR over Germany. The Ural industrial region was covered by an extensive network of power lines. In 1940, it was a rather sparsely populated area with only four percent of the Soviet population and produced 4 billion kWh of electricity, but the existing capacity was soon significantly increased./8 In other words, in terms of per capita electricity capacity in the Urals region became four times more. In preparation for the coming conflict, munitions factories were built along the entire southern Urals and Western Siberia. The railway network in this once sparsely populated area was greatly expanded by the start of the war./9

As soon as the Germans crossed the border, the Soviet Union set about implementing an economic mobilization plan. This plan also included the possibility that the enemy could occupy large areas of the country - as happened during the First World War. For this reason, detailed plans were created for where the dismantled factories were to be transported, and consistent instructions were made to destroy what could not be transported. The relationship between individual enterprises and their dependence on each other were also carefully taken into account. / 10 The carefully implemented plan included the dismantling and evacuation of equipment and people 8-10 days before the Red Army retreated from the territory where the plant or factory was located, then 24 hours were allotted to destroy the remaining valuable property with the help of special detachments. If necessary, the Soviet troops put up fierce resistance in order to provide sufficient time for the performance of their tasks by special detachments for the destruction of property.

Enterprises almost always moved towards the Ural industrial region, in particular to the area of ​​Sverdlovsk, Molotov, Ufa, Chkalov, and Magnitogorsk. This is a region where plants and factories were built a few years before the war and where dismantled and transported enterprises from the western regions of the Soviet Union began their work again./11

In just the first three months after the start of the war, more than 1,360 large industrial plants were moved. Due to tight control, the evacuated enterprises began to work again in an incredibly short time: only three or four weeks passed before large factories and enterprises again began to provide the Red Army with products. Workers had to work 12-14 hours a day, seven days a week. Within three to four months, Soviet production again reached pre-war levels./12

Evacuation

The "Soviet feat" was possible only because millions of skilled workers, managers, engineers and specialists were brought to these areas along with their factories. As early as February 1940, German intelligence agents were reporting systematic deportations of Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish populations from Western Ukraine./13 In June 1940, up to one million Jewish refugees from German-occupied Poland, as well as many hundreds of thousands of Poles, were deported to Siberia. Then, in the weeks leading up to June 22, 1941, mass deportations of the civilian population took place along the entire border with Germany, Hungary and Romania. The Soviets, informed by spies, Allied intelligence, and German traitors, wasted no time deporting those civilians, which were most needed in the Ural industrial region./14

Soviet historians admitted several years ago that the Soviet Union had plans to rebuild the entire railway system long before the war for military purposes in a very short time. The goal was to prevent the Germans from getting hold of strategically important equipment. Soviet success in this endeavor was almost complete: despite great amount railway cars, locomotives, and special equipment, transport in the border areas, intended for the deployment of troops in preparation for an attack on Europe, most of the rolling stock was withdrawn before the Germans launched their lightning strike on June 22, 1941. During the first five weeks, when the German troops pushed the Soviet troops inland, only 577 locomotives, 270 passenger cars and 21,947 railway freight cars became the prey of the Germans. In percentage terms, this amounted to only 2.3, 0.8 and 2.5 percent of the total./15

During the first few months of the war, one million railroad cars loaded with industrial equipment, raw materials, and people withdrew from the front line./16 I will not go into the specifics of the scale Soviet program deportation of the civilian population. This is what I did in detail in The Dissolution. Suffice it to note here that before the war more than 90 million people lived in the areas conquered by Germany during the Second World War. The Soviets deported about 25-30 million of them. They focused their efforts on the deportation of certain groups.

So they preferred urban population the rural, the skilled illiterate, the large educated minorities (Jews and Russians in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States) and the more hostile indigenous population. Because the Soviets began their deportation program long before the outbreak of war, and because the western borderlands were not usually densely populated, Soviet cities that fell into German hands during the first few days and weeks of the war were greatly depopulated—by 90 percent in some cases and more than 50 percent on average. The share of deportees was greater in cities in Ukraine or Belarus than in the Baltic republics, and if these cities were near the western border, and not further east; and if they had large educated minorities, and were not dominated by the indigenous population./17

The scorched earth policy was extremely well prepared by the Soviets. An extensive armaments program was launched 13 years before 1941, long before Adolf Hitler was a real contender for the leadership of Germany. Significant investments have been made in rather sparsely populated and underdeveloped areas in order to develop its transport networks, power plants and heavy industry. However, there was a particular lack of social infrastructure, such as housing and hospitals, to provide for the millions of civilians who were deported here between 1940 and 1941. As a result, 15-20 million civilians died from epidemics, starvation, overwork, lack of shelter, lack of clothing and the harsh Siberian winter.

The collapse of the economy in the occupied eastern territories

The picture for the advancing German troops was extremely unfavorable. The railroad system is destroyed. There was no rolling stock. Water pipes and power plants were destroyed. In order to organize the production of raw materials and petroleum products, the Germans created the so-called economic headquarters "Vostok".

The Soviet scorched earth tactics very quickly forced the economic headquarters to intensify work on all types of production. Even the production of consumer goods was included in the program, because the industry in the occupied territories was unable to resume production after being almost completely destroyed and dismantled by the Soviets and the evacuation of most of the management personnel and technicians.

Electricity production amounted to 2.57 million kW in the occupied territories - which is about one-fourth of all pre-war Soviet production in these territories - less than one-eighth (300,000 kW) remained intact. Soviet destruction efforts were so meticulous that by the end of March 1943, production had been increased to no more than 630,000 kW, which was still only a quarter of the pre-war level. /18 (See Table 1.)

However, differences across regions were significant. In the Reichskommissariat (RK) Ostland (the Baltic states and Belarus), about half of the original capacity of 270,000 kW survived, and by the end of March 1943 almost 90 percent of the pre-war capacity had been returned to service. But in Ukraine, only 7 percent (145,000 kW) of electricity, with a capacity of 2.2 million kW, was still functioning. The thoroughness of the efforts of the Bolsheviks is evidenced by the fact that by the end of March 1943, it was possible to return to operation the capacities of no more than 350,000 kW. This is only 16 percent of pre-war capacities. In practice, even these capacities rarely worked at full capacity due to the guerrilla threat and the almost complete lack of coal supplies. It is obvious that industrial production has been dealt a mortal blow. As already mentioned, the production of electricity before the war amounted to 10 billion kWh annually in the occupied eastern territories. The German administration succeeded in generating only 750 million kWh of electricity from the time of the occupation until the end of 1942. For 1943, it was planned to increase them to 1.4 billion kWh - which was still 86 percent below the pre-war level - which was never reached, since only 1 billion kWh were actually produced./19 It is significant that the planned increase in production and extraction of products for 1943 was realized only in isolated cases. Actual production of basic raw materials or energy supplies fell far short of the stated targets, despite the increased focus on retooling the economy.

The consequences of the planned destruction of industrial production by the Soviet army are shown in Table 2.

The main productions of coal, iron ore, steel, electricity, cement and other important ones were almost completely destroyed. Compared to pre-war levels, coal production averaged 2.4%, iron ore production 1.2%, steel production was non-existent, electricity production was 8.8%, and cement production was 11.6%!

Another indication of the deplorable state of the economy in the territory of occupied Russia was the number work force. In 1940, there were 31.2 million Soviet specialists and workers./20 At the end of 1942, employment in industry (with the exception of Food Industry) amounted to only 750,000 people. If we consider employment only in industrial enterprises, that is, without taking into account handicrafts, the number of employees was only 600,000 (Table 3)

Six hundred thousand in an area where 75 million lived before the war is impossible! Even if one adds an unknown number of people employed in the food industry, it is clear that industrial employment under the German administration was equivalent to one-tenth of the pre-war level. Worst of all, the productivity of this labor force was well below the pre-war norm. It is noteworthy that in the Baltic countries (the largest of which, Lithuania, had very little industry), only 8% of the population remained from the pre-war level, they nevertheless constituted a quarter of the entire industrial workforce under German administration.

The Soviet deportations of skilled personnel led to forced measures such as the "posting" of about 10,000 civilian specialists from the Reich in order to overcome the severe shortage of personnel. / 21 Based on the available statistics, it can be argued that the Soviets deported at least 70% of workers before the German occupation. This means that the number of workers employed under the German administration (generally less skilled than the deported workers) was between 2 and 3 million. Not more than a million people were employed in production, despite the huge need for workers, unemployment reached enormous proportions (50-70 percent) at the height of the gigantic demand for literally any kind of product.

According to Soviet data, before the start of the war in the areas occupied by the Germans by November 1941, 63% of coal, 68% of iron, 58% of steel, 60% of aluminum, 38% of grain and 84% of sugar were produced from the total production in the Soviet Union./22 The documents of the German economic headquarters "Vostok" show, in fact, very similar figures. The Soviets, with help, fires, destruction, sabotage and deportation of workers and the population, made it impossible to use these industrial capacities. Instead of increasing German military and economic power, these areas became a huge burden and added cost to the German economy.

Hunger

The following secret report of the German Economic Headquarters for the period October 1-10, 1941, describes the situation:

Some food has been found... it appears that virtually all supplies and raw materials have either been systematically removed from these areas or rendered unusable. Thus, raw materials are still found in small quantities, slightly easing the needs of the Reich .... Raw materials have not been supplied to factories for some time now. / 23

The same situation is in the case of food, especially grains. Reading the same report:

Our experience shows that the Russians systematically remove or destroy all food supplies. The urban population of the conquered cities would thus have to be fed by the Wehrmacht or starve. Obviously, by forcing us to provide additional food for the population, the Soviet leadership intends to aggravate the already difficult situation with the food of the German Reich. In fact, the current food situation allows us to feed Russian population from our own stocks only if we cut supplies to the army or cut the rations of our own population./24

At the very beginning of the war, all efforts to destroy property were carried out in the agricultural sector and were timed to coincide with the destruction of machine and tractor stations. As a rule, these stations were found empty or with equipment unusable. At first, the cattle population remained intact. But over the following weeks, things took a turn for the worse. As we progress german army from west to east there was practically no livestock, no grain, no fuel. The Luftwaffe and POWs reported that the Soviets were harvesting crops from the fields before retreating. After the occupation of Ukraine, it became obvious that the food situation would be getting worse. In many cases, even the seeds needed for sowing were distributed to help starving Ukrainians. This, in turn, further reduced the area under crops. It is estimated that 43 million tons of grain were produced in the occupied eastern territories under Soviet rule in 1940. Under the German administration, it was possible to harvest in 1941 about 13 million tons. One of the reasons was that the German offensive in Russia was the most rapid in the northern and central sections, thus giving the Soviets time to destroy or evacuate a significant portion of the harvest in Ukraine. In 1942, even less was harvested, only 11.7 million tons. According to Dallin, the German administration succeeded in sowing about three-quarters of the pre-war acreage. Fertilizer was virtually non-existent, and yields per acre were lower in 1942 than in previous years. Compared with an average yield per hectare of approximately 2,200 pounds (14 bushels/acre) in Ukraine in the late 1930s, the Germans managed to produce only 1,500 pounds (10 bushels/acre). : the use of seed grain to alleviate the difficult food situation in the cities, the growing guerrilla threat and the shortage of workers and equipment greatly reduced the yield.

German mounted reconnaissance on the outskirts of Mogilev, set on fire by the Red Army. 1941

German specialists were too dispersed to effectively ensure the supply of agricultural products. Of course, the Germans periodically tried to "comb" the area in order to find the accumulated supplies, but their efforts were not crowned with much success. In retreat, the Red Army also destroyed the entire agricultural distribution system, and the German administration was forced to create its own - not an easy task, given the wartime conditions. Not only too little time and difficult conditions did not allow to organize the distribution more successfully, but also the actions of the Bolsheviks who were putting up resistance in the occupied territories. All these difficulties arose not because of the "German mentality" or "German politics", which - contrary to the propaganda of the Soviets and the Allies, was aimed at seeking mutual understanding with the liberated Slavic peoples.

Setting aside the ruthlessness that allegedly characterizes the German occupation of Russia, it is worth saying that the Germans had never before encountered the inhuman concept of total war applied by the USSR. Even the Jewish historian Alexander Dallin admits:

"The Soviet harvest was, in practice, much more efficient (emphasis added) than the German one. As a result, German peasants were often able to keep larger stocks than before the war. In all likelihood, hidden stocks remained quite significant. .."/26

Between 1941 and 1943, fifteen thousand railway wagons with agricultural equipment and machinery were sent from Germany to the occupied eastern territories under the so-called Ostackerprogramm ("Eastern Agricultural Program"). It included 7,000 thousand tractors, 20,000 thousand generators, 250,000 thousand steel ploughs, and 3,000,000 million scythes. In addition, thousands of bulls, cows, pigs, and stallions were sent to these areas for breeding purposes. Available statistics indicate that German agricultural assistance between July 1941 and 1943 amounted to 445 million RM (Reichsmark)" / 27

The pre-war Soviet harvest in 1940 amounted to 82 million tons of grain, of which about 30% was allocated for seeds and fodder purposes. Theoretically, the population of the USSR thus had access to 57 million tons, or slightly less than 800 grams per day per person. In practice, of course, this amount was less, since part of this amount was reserved in anticipation of the coming war with Germany./28 Of the thirteen million tons under the German administration in 1941, only 9 million tons were left for the indigenous population. Of this amount, 2 million tons were taken by the German troops. The amount requisitioned by the German army was indeed quite moderate. This is also evidenced by the fact that the Red Army used only 31.4 million tons of grain in 1940, in Last year peace! While another 350,000 tons were transported to Germany to provide for their civilian population./29 About 7 million tons remained for the population of the occupied territories.

On a per capita basis, this amounted to less than 400 grams per day (less than one pound) - two times lower than in 1940. Meat and fats were rarely available. But this average figure does not reflect the full picture. On the one hand, we noted that the yields were probably much higher than the German statistics show. This means that at least the rural population, which was in the majority, ate much better than the urban population. Also, many city dwellers were able to obtain food from peasants illegally, as it is difficult to control the black market. In this way, the cities received food from the peasants, which the German authorities were unable to trace, on the other hand, transport is often an insurmountable problem, so that even the minimum supply of food arrived in the cities either late or there was not enough for everyone. In addition, the guerrillas destroyed or confiscated a significant part of the collected grain. Finally, the German authorities often tried to give additional rations to factory workers. Of course, this was only possible at the expense of the rest of the population. The fact that the German authorities were unable to succeed in obtaining special rations for workers in important industries or for those engaged in hard manual labor shows how serious the situation was./30 Those urban dwellers who were unemployed or had no property to trade the peasants were really in trouble: they were doomed to starvation.

The desperate situation with food in the cities is shown by regular secret reports of the East Economic Headquarters sent to Berlin:

November 11, 1941: Food shortages and lack of even the most essential consumer goods are the main reason why the morale of the Russian and Ukrainian population is becoming more and more depressed... Kiev has not received any grain since its occupation on September 19, 1941... Partisans are stealing food civilian population at night. Food supplies are also burned by the partisans. Difficulties are especially great in the area of ​​Army Group South, where it is impossible to feed all the prisoners of war due to their huge numbers.... The authorities are constantly trying to find enough food for the prisoners, although even buckwheat porridge is available only in limited quantities.... We are very concerned our ability to feed the urban population in the south. /31

December 8, 1941: The food situation in the city of Kharkov is extremely critical. There is practically no food for the population. There is almost no bread. /32

January 22, 1942: The regular distribution of food to the urban civilian population in the "South" zone is more and more limited, and the situation will not change for the foreseeable future. /33

February 23, 1942: Food supplies for the civilian population major cities so small as to cause serious concern. /33

March 1, 1942: The mood of the population is low due to food problems .... In the densely populated Donetsk region, there is not enough food for the entire population. As a result, several thousand people died of starvation. In some cases, even highly qualified specialists and teachers were among the victims. /33

March 5, 1942: The food situation continues to be very serious and some cities are actually starving. In Pushkin, it was discovered that there was a sale of human flesh, passing it off as pork./33

March 16, 1942 (report of the rear commander of the Central region): V major cities(food situation) continues to be unsatisfactory, and in Kharkov it is catastrophic. As time goes by, it becomes more and more difficult to feed the urban population... /33

June 3, 1942: The food situation in the cities is getting worse and worse, because part of the food stocks collected for the population and sowing have been destroyed by the partisans. /33

The constant efforts of the German authorities to ensure supplies enough food for the civilian population was devalued by horrendously poor harvests, disastrous transportation, guerrilla attacks, the destruction of food supplies by the Soviets, and the inability to conduct regular exchanges of goods between major cities and the countryside. While the food supply of the rural population and small towns was relatively sufficient, the civilian population from large cities and millions of prisoners were starving. Thus, the German reputation suffered for the actions of the Soviets.

German economic recovery efforts

Equipment worth one billion RM was imported from the Reich for the mining, energy and manufacturing industries in the occupied territories. To this must be added the significant costs for the transport sector, as well as for road construction equipment, which is estimated at more than one billion Reichsmarks. After deliveries of a significant amount of coal, which was used as a fuel for civilian rail freight transport, German aid for the reconstruction of industry and infrastructure amounted to over 2.5 billion RM./34 This amount does not include agricultural aid of about half a billion Reichsmarks. The scale of German assistance in the civilian sector can be better appreciated if one realizes that the total volume of industrial production in these areas from the beginning of the occupation until the end of 1943 amounted to approximately 5 billion RM. (This figure includes finished goods, repairs, etc.)/35 Although exact figure is unknown, it is worth assuming that the total aid amounted to just over 2 billion RM./36 In other words, the amount of German economic aid (except for agriculture) was greater than the value of all industrial output during the occupation! The annual output per employee was RM 1,000 per year. For comparison: in Germany, a worker produced products worth 4,000 RM in 1936./37

Most of the production was absorbed by the German occupation army. Thus, the Soviet scorched-earth tactics reduced the supply of consumer goods for its own population of about 50 million to negligible levels. The production of consumer goods was practically zero, because the destruction and evacuation of all industrial enterprises and raw materials, the deportation of personnel by the Soviets, as well as the impossibility of quickly correcting the situation, thanks to the actions of the partisans. Thus, the urban population could offer nothing to the peasants in exchange for their products. And since the peasant was not able to buy anything with the money he received, he did not want to part with his products, and the exchange was disrupted.

German economic assistance to the occupied Soviet territories amounted to approximately one percent of Germany's gross national product of those years./38 Even today, this figure is more than the assistance of industrialized countries to developing countries. West Germany, for example, has been helping about half a percent of GNP since 1960, a period of relative prosperity and low defense spending.

Indeed, the economic assistance of about 3 billion RM (including in the industrial and agricultural sector) to the occupied eastern territories is also equivalent to one fourth of the total gross capital investments in Germany in 1942 and 1943 (12 billion RM)./39

A comparison of traffic volumes between the Reich and the occupied eastern territories provides additional information.

If we take only the tonnage, then the Reich received about 20 percent more cargo from the eastern territories than from Germany to the East. Considering also about 2 million tons of grain delivered in 1943, /40 exchange for Germany was more profitable at first glance. However, shipments from the Eastern Territories were mainly various raw materials and raw ore of a rather low value in monetary terms, while products from Germany were of very high value and quality (with the exception of coal for railway transport). Since the finished product is worth much more than the various raw materials, on the other hand, this exchange was much more profitable for the occupied eastern territories, although, of course, the scarcity of available data does not allow us to make calculations over a longer period, even within a large error. The Eastern Territories supplied agricultural products worth 1.6 billion Reichsmarks./41 The cost of supplies of German cars, tractors, generators, equipment of all kinds for industry and agriculture amounted to approximately 3 billion Reichsmarks. From this sum we must subtract the supplies of raw materials and ore produced during the period of occupation, as well as the various services rendered to the German army. It is not known what values ​​should be used for these calculations. However, due to the very small amount of raw materials and extremely low level industrial production, this value should be about 25 percent of the relatively small amount of 2 billion rubles.

Thus, the occupied eastern territories as such contributed practically nothing economically in the struggle against Bolshevism. In fact, they received incredibly generous rebuilding assistance. This assistance was hardly made out of purely altruistic motives. However, this was a unique period in the history of relations between the occupying power and the conquered territories of the country. It would be wrong to attribute the German economic collapse in the eastern territories to the efforts of the Soviets alone. All the factors mentioned here are undoubtedly very important. However, there is another, no less important aspect. When Germany launched a preemptive strike against the USSR, it did so with an almost complete lack of data on the real Soviet military power, the size of Soviet weapons production, and on the preparation of the USSR for total war. Worse, Germany was completely unprepared to overcome rough terrain, had no plans to manage the economy in the occupied territories, which could not work on its own, as it depended on directives and decrees from Moscow, since enterprises, of which all administrative, managerial and technical personnel were deported, they could not show private initiative. These additional problems made it impossible to establish an economy in the eastern territories. Chaos brought hunger, and starvation brought guerrilla support.

Thus, various aid measures such as the Ostackerprogramm and gigantic investments in Agriculture in the occupied eastern territories were indeed doomed to failure because they did not address the cause of the problem.

Consequences

It is indisputable that the systemic Soviet dismantling of factories and their shipment to the Urals, the carefully planned removal and destruction of stocks of raw materials and food, and the large-scale deportation of civilians were begun long before June 22, 1941. Indeed, evidence indicates that these efforts were significantly activated ten to fourteen days prior to that date. Now we do not know whether Stalin believed that the German offensive would the exact date June 22, 1941, although Sorge and others provided him with such information. Perhaps Stalin felt that Germany's military build-up was insufficient to allow her to attack on the day he was told. But that is beside the point. Both sides knew that the other would attack as soon as it was ready. This fact forever refutes the accusation of the Germans in a surprise attack on the unprepared, peace-loving Soviet Union.

The initial German military successes were achieved not because there was an element of surprise, but in spite of Stalin's knowledge of German preemptive action and in spite of the huge buildup of Soviet military forces to attack central Europe - which was the reason for Germany's preemptive war in the first place. Moreover, the allegation of systematic German brutality in Russia opens up as simple Soviet propaganda. Indeed, famine was widespread in the major cities of the German-occupied Soviet Union, big number Soviet prisoners of war died of starvation, Soviet cities were in ruins after the German troops retreated, and the Soviet population lost tens of millions of deaths during World War II. However, it is also known that the inhumane Soviet scorched earth tactics were the cause of famine in the German-occupied Soviet territories, the apocalypse of destruction unprecedented in the history of wars and the death of up to 20 million Soviet citizens, many of whom were deported to the cold wastelands of Siberia and the Urals, where epidemics, lack of housing and medical care, unimaginably hard work and extreme climate have allowed only the most resilient to survive. Add the costly human wave tactics to the Soviet military strategy and it is clear that Soviet brutality alone is responsible for the incredibly huge human losses suffered by the peoples of the Soviet Union - more than 30 million people!

The real number of Soviet military casualties is not the main topic of this article, and space does not allow a detailed study of this topic here. However, an appendix has been added that attempts to arrive at a more realistic estimate of Soviet military casualties based on an analysis of post-war USSR census figures from 1959, 1970 and 1979 and a comparison with the 1939 Soviet census, adjusted to the greatest extent possible abroad and demographic changes in period from 1939 to 1945. Suffice it to say that the Soviet Union lost more than 25 percent of its male and nearly 9 percent of its female population. For the population that remained under Stalin's control at the peak of German expansion in Russia, the equivalent losses are 33% and 13%. Curiously, modern standard reviews of Soviet wartime casualties generally admit only 20 million people. Why this unusual understatement for a military ally? Recognizing that the Soviet Union lost nearly 20 million civilians, rather than 6-7 million during World War II, would place the responsibility for much of the non-military casualties on the Soviets themselves.

Naturally, the imaginary German excesses in Russia neatly fit into the "Holocaust" fairy tale. Eventually, the area of ​​the Soviet Union occupied by Germany was inhabited by over 3.5 million Jews until June 22, 1941. /42 If we add about one million Jewish refugees from eastern Poland at the beginning of 1940, it is obvious that in order to support the charge of genocide, it was necessary to lower the veil of silence around the Soviet long-term preparation, expectation, thoroughness, cruelty and scale of burning the earth during the Second World War . Since the historical framework in which the German massacres allegedly took place simply did not exist, it became necessary to create myths that outwardly seemed to be proved by what was obvious to everyone: the initial rapid German successes and the horrific destruction of Soviet cities and countryside after that. how the Germans were ousted from there.

It is our duty to remove this veil of silence and concealment and replace the myth of Soviet unpreparedness with the terrible truth of Soviet scorched earth.

Walter Sanning
Original article: Soviet Scorched-Earth Warfare: Facts And Consequences by Walter N. Sanning .
Published with minor abridgements, without appendix.

Notes

1. Helmdach, Erich. Täuschungen und Versäumnisse, Berg am See: 1979, p. 155.
2. Brennecke, Gerhard. , Tuebingen: 1970, p. 303.
3. Fischer, Ludwig, and Friedrich Gollert. Warschau unter deutscher Herrschaft, Cracow: 1942, p. 186.
4. brennecke, Die Nürnberger Geschichtsentstellung, pp. 303 and 322.
5. a. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg(Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Ed.), Stuttgart: 1983, Volume 4, p. 785.
   b. ibid., p. 782.
6. Scott, John. Jenseits des Ural, Stockholm: 1944, p. 304.
7. Helmdach, Erich. Uberfall? Der sowjetisch-deutsche Aufmarsch 1941, Neckargemuend/Germany: 1978, 4th Chapter.
8. scott, Jenseits des Ural, p. 310.
9. ibid., pp. 303 and 310.
10. Telpuchowski, Boris Semionowitsch. Die Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges 1941-1945, (Andreas Hillgruber and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, eds.), Frankfurt/Main: 1961, pp. 81-83, 86.
11. Wirtschaftsstab Ost. Vierzehntagesbericht Wi Stab Ost (3.8.-16.8. 1941) , 30 August 1941, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/11.
12. Telpuchowski, , p. 81 and 82.
13. Aschenauer, Rudolf. Krieg ohne Grenzen, Leoni, 1982, p. 115.
14. Sanning, Walter N. The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry, Torrance, Calif.: 1983, 3rd Chapter.
15. Reichswirtschaftsministerium. Die UdSSR Anfang 1941, (Date unknown), Federal Archives Koblenz/Germany, Bestand R 24/817.
16. Telpuchowski, Die Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges, p. 84.
17. sanning, The Dissolution, pp. 86-101.
18. Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Chefgruppe W. Wirtschaftsgrößenordnungen fur die besetzten Ostgebiete, 3 March 1943, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/260.
19. Reichsministerium fuer die besetzten Ostgebiete. , 20 November 1944. Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/260.
20. Telpuchowski, Die Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges, p. 85.
21. Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Chefgruppe Wirtschaft im Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, 20 November 1944, p. 4.
22. Telpuchowski, Die Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges, p. 78.
23. Wirtschaftsstab Ost. Halbmonatsbericht Wi Stab Ost (1.-15.10.41), 2 November 1941, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/310.
24. Memorandum dated October 3, 1941, titled Die Versorgung der Städte Rußlands im noch unbesetzten Gebiet, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/11.
25. Dallin, Alexander. , London: 1957, p. 367.
26. ibid.
27. ibid., p. 368.
28. Perspektiven zur Verpflegungsversorgung der U.d.S.S.R. im Winterfeldzug 1942/43, (Date unknown), Chef d.Vers.d.200.Schtz. Div. der 5. Armee, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/23Z.
29. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 375.
30. Letter from the Reichsminister fuer die besetzten Ostgebiete dated 5 August 1942 to Ministerialdirektor Riecke concerning the food supply of the civilian population in the Occupied Eastern Territories ( Versorgung der Zivilbevoelkerung in den besetzten Ostgebieten), Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/310: contains excerpts from the secret monthly and special reports made by the Economic Staff East, the German military and the German civilian administration of the RK Ostland and the RK Ukraine.
31. Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Halbmonatsbericht Wi Stab Ost (16.-31.10.41), 27 November 1941, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/68.
32. Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Halbmonatsbericht Wi Stab Ost (1.-15.11.41), 8 December 1941, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/68.
33. Letter from the Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete dated 5 August 1942 to Ministerialdirektor Riecke.
34. Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Chefgruppe Wirtschaft im Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, p. 5.
35. ibid.
36. Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1952(Statistical Yearbook of the Federal Republic of Germany), Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, lists the value of production of industrial countries before the Second World War. Net production reached the following shares of gross production in the years indicated: U.S.A. (1939) 43%; United Kingdonl (1935) 42%; Canada (1937) 42%; Norway (1937) 36%; Denmark (1939) 47%; Finland (1937) 42%; South Africa (1937) 45%.
37. ibid.
38. Klein, Burton H. Germany's Economic Preparations for War, Cambridge/Mass.: 1959, p. 256. The gross national product of the German Reich for 1942 and 1943 was given as RM 143 and RM 160 billion, respectively. Relative to the entire reconstruction assistance of about RM 3 billion (incl. agricultural aid of RM 445 million) provided to the Occupied Eastern Territories this amounts to 1%.
39. ibid.
40. Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941-1945, p. 375.
41. ibid.
42. sanning, The Dissolution, p. 52.
43. ibid., 4, Chapter.

About the author.

Walter N. Sanning is the pseudonym of a scientist and businessman who was born in 1936 to an ethnic German family in a region that was part of the former Soviet Union for decades. After growing up in military Germany, he migrated to the United States in the 1950s, where he met his future wife. He graduated from the prestigious Pacific Northwestern University with a bachelor's degree (cum laude) in business.

He went on to be a graduate student with a fellowship at East Coast Ivy League Universities where he concentrated on international business, finance and economics. He then taught business, finance, and economics at the undergraduate and graduate levels at a major West Coast University. The Sanning family moved to Germany in 1970, where he then worked for many years in a major financial institution and assumed a leading position there.

Walter Sanning is married and speaks English and German. He and his wife have four children, all born in the United States.

In 1983, writer Walter Sanning published The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewly based on Jewish and Allied sources. German title"Disappearance" - "Die Auflosung"). In this excellent demographic study, based almost entirely on Allied and Jewish sources, Sanning concluded that Jewish losses in Hitler's territory were comparable to those of other affected peoples.

He devoted a great deal of time and effort to research in the American and German archives. He involuntarily has to deal with questionable estimates all the time; Israeli, German, Polish and Soviet archives were inaccessible to him; countless difficulties arose when working with Jewish statistics: who is a Jew (a hundred years ago this was clear, but in an era of cultural assimilation, religious indifference and mixed marriages, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a Jew from a non-Jew); Zionist and Soviet statistics are unreliable, and in the US, Jews as such are not recorded at all.

Sanning proved that the vast majority of European Jews illegally, that is, bypassing official statistics, emigrated to Palestine, the United States and other countries. In addition, a significant part of the Jews ended up in the USSR, and much more than it is stated in the myths of the Holocaust ™.

Thus, according to Sanning, more than half of the Jews fled from the German-occupied part of Poland under the Soviet protectorate, and the Nazis welcomed when the Jews voluntarily left their occupation zone. These data cannot be confirmed by official figures, since the vast majority of these Jews were deported and a significant number died on the way to Siberia or in Soviet camps. In any case, the responsibility for their death lies with the USSR. Further, relying on census data and reports from various sources, such as the American Jewish Council for Relief of Russia, which existed during the war years, or the Yiddish-language Soviet newspaper Ainikeit, Sanning concluded that the vast majority of Jews from western regions The USSR (about 80%) were evacuated and saved. If the German Einsatzkommandos shot Jews, it was only as partisans, saboteurs and saboteurs.

Sanning also analyzed the demographics of Jews in other regions occupied by the Germans during World War II. He took into account the facts that the number of Jewish emigrants during the war (only from Constanta in Romania by sea left for Istanbul by sea), an unusually active pre-war emigration, as well as negative birth rates, etc.

All this data he took from allied, Jewish and pro-Zionist sources. Sanning then compared the results obtained with the results of the first census conducted immediately after the war in the respective states (most often in 1946, and sometimes in 1947) and deduced the figure of 1.27 million "missing" Jews, who, apparently, did not entered the census. In fact, a significant part of the "missing" emigrated after the war for understandable reasons. Why would a non-communist Jew stay in war-ravaged Poland, where anti-Semitism was strong, and power passed to the Stalinists? In view of such a gloomy prospect, any Jew at the first opportunity - and the borders were not very closed at that time - tried to get away from the country, to the USA, Palestine, France or somewhere else.

In one post-war Germany, there were 250 thousand Jews in the camps of "displaced persons", who then dispersed in all directions. Sanning traces this flow of emigrants and shows how, sometimes adventurously, the Jews got to their new homeland: many lived for years in Iran or Cyprus, others, before reaching their destination, stopped in Morocco or Tunisia.

According to Sanning's estimates, 130,000 Jews died in the USSR, and a little over 300,000 Jews died in other countries occupied by the Germans.

You can read more about Sanning's research in Jürgen Graf's book The Great Lies of the 20th Century.

Scorched earth tactics- a method of warfare in which the retreating troops carry out the complete and large-scale destruction of all stocks vital for the enemy (food, fuel, etc.) and any industrial, agricultural, civilian facilities in order to prevent their use by the advancing enemy.

The term "scorched earth" applies only to combat operations, during which retreating troops destroy objects of paramount importance to the enemy.

"Scorched earth" tactics are prohibited by Protocol I of the 1977 Geneva Convention.

Story

This section contains far from all historical examples.

6th century BC e.

The first known case in history of using this tactic is the war of the Scythians with the army of Darius I, around 512 BC. e. who invaded the Black Sea steppes (see Book IV of the History of Herodotus).

15th century

At the end of 1474 during the struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the Principality of Moldavia. Numerous Ottoman troops led by the Rumelian Beylerbey Suleiman Pasha entered the territory of the Moldavian Principality. Using the tactics of "scorched earth", the Moldavian prince Stefan III defeated the enemy at Vaslui (January 10, 1475).

19th century

Napoleonic Wars

Pyrenean Wars

During the (third) Napoleonic invasion of Portugal in 1810, as the Portuguese retreated to Lisbon, they were ordered to destroy all food supplies that the French could get. The order was given due to the marauding of the French troops and the mistreatment of citizens during previous invasions.

After Battles of Busaku Masséna's army marched on Coimbra, where much of the Old University and the city's library were sacked, houses and furniture were destroyed, and several civilians were killed. There were cases of looting by British soldiers, but such cases were usually investigated and the perpetrators punished. When the French troops reached the Torres-Vedras line near Lisbon, the French soldiers said that the city was more like a wasteland. When Massena reached the city of Viseu, wishing to replenish the dwindling food supplies of the army, the city was empty, and the only provisions left were grapes and lemons, the use of which in large quantities was more of a laxative than a source of calories. Low morale, hunger, disease and indiscipline weakened French army and forced her to retreat the following spring.

American Civil War

This tactic was used extensively by Union forces under Sheridan and Sherman during the American Civil War. General Sherman used this tactic during his march to the Atlantic. Sherman's goal was to break the will and destroy enemy logistics by burning or destroying crops and other resources that could be used by Confederate sympathizers. During the campaign, his men burned all the court books in front of the courthouse so that the planters could not prove their ownership of the land. Another incident occurred when for thirty-six days Sherman's army moved through Georgia, meeting with little resistance, plundering the countryside and its inhabitants.

Other instances of the use of tactics during the civil war are also known.

20th century

The Great Patriotic War

Vietnam War

One of the largest and known cases use of "scorched earth" tactics - Operation Ranch Hand, conducted by the US Army during the Vietnam War to destroy the jungle in Laos and South Vietnam.

Gulf War

The current position of society

Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1977 prohibits the destruction in the course of hostilities of stocks and sources of food and drinking water for the civilian population.

It is prohibited to attack or destroy, remove or render unusable objects essential for the survival of the civilian population, such as food supplies, food-producing agricultural areas, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation installations, specifically in order to prevent their use by the civilian population or the adverse party as a means of subsistence, regardless of the motive, whether for the purpose of starving civilians, forcing them to leave, or for any other reason. Article 54, Amendments to Protocol I of the 1977 Geneva Conventions

Nevertheless, cases of the use of "scorched earth" tactics are still noted.

Among the countries that have not yet ratified Protocol I are the USA, Israel, Iran, Pakistan.

see also

Notes

1. English version of the Supplement to Protocol 1 of the 1977 Geneva ConventionPDF(English)
2. Translation of the Addendum to Protocol 1 of the 1977 Geneva ConventionPDF
3. 516, 514 BC e .: there are different justifications for relatively close dates.
4. A.O. Chubaryan. History of Europe. Volume 2 Medieval Europe. Chapter V
5. Personal memoirs of Grant Ulysses, chapter XXV: "supplies within the reach of Confederate armies I regarded as much contraband as arms or ordnance stores. Their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as the destruction of armies. I continued this policy to the close of the war. Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished. Instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the direction of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster or commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our Northern depots. But much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when it could not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession and rebellion. This policy I believe exercised a material influence in hastening the end.” (English)
6. Sherman's March to the Sea (indefinite) . sciway3.net. Retrieved 31 January 2019.(English)

Scorched earth. Order 0428.

With the beginning of the advance of German troops through the Soviet territories during the Second World War, the Soviet leadership immediately began to use the "scorched earth tactics".

This tactic was absolutely natural and logical for the Soviet leadership and had great historical roots and practice in the past.

This practice was finally approved by the famous secret order No. 0428 of November 17, 1941. Settlements and other material objects were destroyed not only in the retreat zone, but also continued to be destroyed throughout the territory occupied by the Germans, not only by bombing, but also with the help of partisans and sabotage groups.

Separately, it must be said about the offensive tactics Soviet troops, this is another big topic.

The damage caused to the national economy and citizens of the USSR as a result of World War II has been carefully calculated. His summary indicators were previously announced at the Nuremberg trials. By 1959, the data was clarified. In the statistical compendium " National economy USSR in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." M., 1990, the following is said:

"... completely or partially destroyed and burned 1710 cities and towns and more than 70 thousand villages and villages; burned and destroyed over 6 million buildings and made about 25 million people homeless; destroyed 31,850 industrial enterprises, disabled metallurgical factories, which before the war produced about 60% of steel, mines, which accounted for over 60% of coal production in the country, destroyed 65,000 km of railway track and 4,100 railway stations, 36,000 postal and telegraph institutions, telephone exchanges and other communications enterprises; destroyed and plundered tens of thousands of collective farms and state farms, slaughtered, confiscated or drove to Germany 7 million horses, 17 million cattle, 20 million pigs, 27 million sheep and goats.In addition, they destroyed and defeated 40 thousand . hospitals and other medical institutions, 84 thousand schools, technical schools, higher educational institutions, research institutes, 43 thousand public libraries".

In this enumeration, all destruction is attributed to the Wehrmacht. And this seems to be logical, if there were no war, then this would not have happened. But there is different ways waging war. The "scorched earth tactics" in World War II was massively used only by the Soviet leadership and the army.

Report of the Military Council Western Front to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of November 29, 1941 on the measures taken to fulfill the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 0428

To Comrade Stalin (Dzhugashvilli)
Comrade Shaposhnikov

In pursuance of the order of the Headquarters No. 0428 of November 17 on arson of settlements, the Military Council immediately took the following measures:

1. In divisions and regiments, they began to form hunter teams, which in the majority are already actively working.

2. Intelligence agencies of a special department sent sabotage groups to the territory occupied by the enemy, total number up to 500 people.

3. The armies were assigned a squadron of R-5 and U-2 aircraft, 45 aircraft in total.

4. Manufactured and allocated to parts of individual incendiary means - thermite fuses, balls, cylinders, checkers - a total of 4,300 units.

5. More than 100,000 Molotov cocktails and devices for their use have been issued.

6. To help create teams of hunters in the division, 38 commanders were sent from the reserve of the front.

7. Approved for each army, points to be burned and destroyed and assigned tasks, in this regard, to the branches of the armed forces (aviation, artillery, teams of hunters, sabotage and partisan detachments).

Over the past time, 398 settlements were burned and destroyed (in 12 days), of which: in the 30th army - 105, 16 - 113, 5 - 55, 33 - 17, 43 - 24, 29 - 52, 50 - 32 points.

Most of the points were burned and destroyed by teams of hunters and sabotage groups, artillery, due to the lack of incendiary shells, and aviation, due to bad weather, did not actively work to complete the task.

The active work of the units of the front to set fire to settlements caused serious damage to the Germans, as evidenced by the following order of the German command intercepted by us:
"According to the message of the headquarters of 57 ak, it was established that for Lately in many places, systematic arson of settlements is carried out by individuals and groups penetrating through the front line. It is necessary to increase the control of the movement of the civilian population and strengthen the security at the cantonments."

Work on the implementation of the order of the Headquarters No. 0428 continues in all parts of the front.

Zhukov
Bulganin

Source: TsAMO, f. 208, op. 2524, d. 1, l. 257-258

What do Emperor Alexander I and Soviet dictator Dzhugashvilli have in common? It would seem a wild question, it is enough to compare their appearance: an angel-like enlightened sovereign and a freckled evil ghoul with yellow eyes. However, do not rush to conclusions.

Three years ago, my friend and I visited the village of Tarutino in the Kaluga region. Let me remind you that during the war of 1812 in Tarutino there was a camp of the Russian army, which, having made its famous maneuver, managed to break away from Marshal Murat pursuing it and take an advantageous strategic position. Here, on October 18, 1812, a battle took place between the army of Kutuzov and the troops of Murat. Then Kutuzov failed to achieve decisive success due to the poor interaction of Russian troops.

After talking with an employee of the local museum, we found out that Russian army while standing in Tarutino, she dismantled 199 residential peasant houses for baths, bridges and fuel - almost the entire village. Well, how many baths and bridges were built by glorious warriors! This is probably why Tarutino - once the richest - never again rose to his former strength. What is behind such an attitude towards their own population? Did the brave Kutuzov soldiers dismantle peasant dwellings only for baths and bridges? Maybe they simply scattered the huts over a log for firewood so that Bonaparte would not get a large, rich village to stay? If the arsonists of Count Rostopchin did not spare Moscow, then what can we say about some village? Maybe Dzhugashvilli, with his order No. 0428 - on scorched earth - just imitated Alexander the Blessed? Note that this happened in the fall, on the eve of winter. How did the Tarutino peasants winter, left homeless?

Even then, three years ago, I shared these considerations on the Web and received a response in the form of a link to the article "Treason of Field Marshal Kutuzov." This text seemed to me interesting and detailed. I bring to the attention of readers an excerpt from this material.

Long before the war, Emperor Alexander made a firm decision that, if necessary, to retreat during the invasion of Napoleon, the army would not only retreat, but, if possible, expel the population from the abandoned cities and villages, and completely burn the cities and villages with everyone. the reserves available there. The meaning of this action was that in this way the victorious enemy could not use either whole apartments or food in the occupied settlements. The burning of towns and villages in the retreat zone was to be carried out mainly by Cossack units. At the beginning of February 1812, Alexander told the Austrian ambassador: “I suppose that at the beginning of the war we will be defeated, but I am ready for this; retreating, I will leave behind a desert; men, women, children, cattle, horses - I will take everyone and everything with me, and the Russian light cavalry has no equal in carrying out such operations.

While the Russian army was retreating across Lithuania and Belarus, this strategy was not used, since the advancing enemy had many roads at his disposal and, as a rule, did not move in the same ways as the Russians retreated. The retreating troops had neither the time nor the strength to devastate all of Lithuania and Belarus - and to destroy the areas lying along the retreat route directly turned out to be not a particularly meaningful thing, since their desolation would not bring any damage to the enemy: he walked along other and unknown in advance roads. At that time, they were limited mainly to the partial dispersal of the population from those areas from where it could be dispersed, and the burning of settlements was only sporadically.

However, from the moment the army arrived at Smolensk, it followed the same road along which the enemy pursued it - there were no other paths for pursuit at its disposal. Now the scorched earth strategy made more sense and was immediately applied in full. All the cities and villages through which the army retreated were burned, all the villages on the sides were burned, to which the patrols managed to reach. The French did not immediately understand what they were facing - the destruction of military warehouses or bridges during the retreat was a common thing in any war, when passing from hand to hand, settlements often caught fire from shooting or negligence of the troops, and sometimes individual houses and quarters were set on fire to directly cover the retreat - but the idea of ​​​​systematically burning down their own villages and cities entirely just so that the enemy would not find comforts and food in them when he occupied them - this idea seemed to the French so self-evidently wild that for some time they could not admit that the Russians were precisely it is carried out.

However, I had to believe. The final insight overtook the French in Vyazma. Here, according to Caulaincourt, “on the basis of the testimony of the inhabitants of the city, we were convinced that all measures for setting fire and spreading the fire were taken by the Cossack rearguard detachment long before our arrival, and the arson was done as soon as our troops showed up. Indeed, in various houses, especially in those where food was available, combustible materials were methodically prepared and laid out for arson. In other words, we have obtained proof that this case there was a fulfillment of measures prescribed from above and prepared in advance - a proof similar to those that we already had before and received afterwards. These facts, which had already been reported by some residents of other cities and towns, but which we refused to believe, were then confirmed at every step. Everyone was shocked by this, and the emperor as much as the army, although he pretended to laugh at this new type of war.

The burning of Moscow, prepared by Rostopchin and carried out on his orders (mostly by police officers subordinate to him) was just another act of executing this strategy. Then, at a meeting with Kutuzov, Napoleon's truce, Lauriston, extensively justified the French army before him, assuring that she did not burn Moscow, that she, on the contrary, tried to put out the fire. "The French would not have defiled themselves by such actions even if they had occupied London." Kutuzov quite calmly replied that he knew this well, that Moscow was burned by the Russians themselves, who valued Moscow no less and no more than any other city of the empire. Rostopchin, long before the surrender of Moscow, informed the dignitaries with whom he corresponded that if the city was nevertheless abandoned, he, Rostopchin, would burn it down, and that everything was prepared for them for this. In a letter to Bagration dated August 12, apparently , propaganda and intended for distribution in the army, Rostopchin wrote: “... The people of the local / Moscow /, in loyalty to the Sovereign and love for the Fatherland, will decisively die at the walls of Moscow, and if God does not help him in his good enterprise, then, following the Russian rule, do not get villain_, will turn the city to ashes and Napoleon will receive the place where the capital was instead of booty. It’s not bad for him /Napoleon/ to let him know that he doesn’t count millions of bread stores, because he will find coal and ash. On August 13, Rostopchin also wrote about the same to Balashov and (according to Vyazemsky) spoke shortly before leaving Moscow with Chief Police Chief Kaverin and Karamzin. On the morning of September 1, after meeting with Kutuzov, Rostopchin said to Yermolov, according to the latter’s notes: “If you leave Moscow without a fight, then you will see it burning behind you!”

On September 8/20, 1812, Napoleon wrote to Alexander about this application of the “scorched earth” strategy to his own country (in his usual tone of feigned and benevolent admonition to the enemy ruler): “The beautiful, magnificent city of Moscow does not exist: Rostopchin burned it down. 400 incendiaries and caught at the scene of the crime, they all announced that they were burning on the orders of the governor and the chief of police; they were shot. ..Would you like to take away some funds? …Be that as it may, how can one decide to destroy a city, one of the most beautiful in the world and a product of centuries, to achieve such an insignificant goal? So they did, starting from Smolensk, and let six hundred thousand families around the world ... If I assumed that such things could be done by order of Your Majesty, I would not write you this letter, but I consider it impossible that you, with your principles , with their hearts, with the justice of their ideas, could authorize such extremes”, etc.

The emperor of the French was wrong, and he was hardly deceived in his soul on this score. The scorched earth strategy, including the burning of Moscow, was applied, of course, with the knowledge and order of Alexander. Is it conceivable that Barclay and Rostopchin, at their own peril and risk, systematically burned the cities of the Russian Empire, up to its second capital, at their own peril and risk, without obtaining the consent of the autocrat, and without incurring any responsibility for this, even verbal reprimands? Is it conceivable that the emperor, learning about the burning of settlements by the retreating army along the entire retreat zone and about the burning of Moscow, did not clarify for himself and did not stop this system and did not even make a single remark to the military and civilian dignitaries who carried it out, if this was done otherwise than with his knowledge? Of course, it was Alexander who prescribed this method of warfare to the army and Rostopchin; as we remember, he warned the Austrians six months in advance that during the retreat he would leave behind a "desert". As Runich wrote in his memoirs, famous figure Alexander’s time, “for every sane person there is only one way out of the labyrinth in which he found himself, listening to the conflicting opinions that were expressed about the Moscow fire. Undoubtedly, only Emperor Alexander could stop at this measure ... Rostopchin can only be thankful that he skillfully considered and carried out one of the greatest plans that arose in the human mind.

It is interesting to evaluate the effect of all these measures. Russia in 1812 lost 2 million people extinct and killed; of these, the army accounts for about 300,000. The remaining 1.7 million are civilians. The enemy troops, in the course of all conceivable excesses, killed no more than a few hundred or thousands of civilians throughout the country; the vast majority of the victims are those who died of starvation, disease and cold in autumn and winter as a result of the effective implementation of the scorched earth strategy in their own provinces. (In the work of the researcher A. Klepov “Why are historians again turning to the topic of the war of 1812?” The following figures are given: “During the war with Napoleon, about three million inhabitants died in Russia, while its population at the beginning of the 19th century was about 36 million people, which amounted to 10% of the population of the country.(Losses are almost the same as in the USSR in the Patriotic War of 1941-1945.) Of course, in the future this played a huge role in hindering the economic and scientific and technological development of Russia, throwing it back many years" - A.Sh.).

How much did Napoleon lose from this strategy? From Smolensk (including the battle of Smolensk) to Moscow, the loss of his army in the wounded, and killed, and sick, and stragglers, and prisoners (the statistics of Russian losses given above, by contrast, takes into account only irretrievable losses - that is, killed, died from wounds and died from disease, hunger and cold) amounted to approx. 85 thousand people More than half of these losses (including 28 thousand at Borodino, 5 thousand at Shevardino, about 15 thousand at Smolensk and Valutina Gora) fall on battles; a large proportion of the remainder is the usual for any war of that time, developing at a rapid pace (that is, not specifically caused by the "scorched earth" strategy) sanitary losses. During the retreat from Moscow to the Berezina (excluding the battle of the Berezina itself), Napoleon lost (all types of losses are also taken into account here) - 40-45 thousand people; of these, the vast majority can be attributed to the “scorched earth” strategy, since without it, Napoleon’s army would not have starved during the retreat and the battles themselves would have been completely different for it (not to mention the fact that, for example, the battles of Maloyaroslavets would not exist at all).

In general, we can assume that the Russian strategy of "scorched earth" cost Napoleon about 50 thousand people who were out of action, out of 610 thousand people concentrated by him against Russia (without the wagon train, which, however, is not taken into account, however, and the above statistics of the composition and part loss). It should be noted that in the first month of the war, from the border to Vitebsk (where, I repeat, "scorched earth" was not used), Napoleon's troops lost a total of more than 150 thousand people. almost exclusively from desertion and disease. And for three weeks of December, from incredible frosts (there were practically no combat losses at that time), the losses of these troops during the retreat from Lithuania beyond the Neman amounted to approximately 85 thousand people. (these were almost entirely irretrievable losses, since the wounded and prisoners of this time died almost one hundred percent). Russian losses of the civilian population from starvation, disease and cold - they must be attributed in the vast majority precisely to the "scorched earth" strategy - amounted, as already mentioned, to more than one and a half million people

Thus, the "scorched earth" bought the incapacitation of one enemy soldier at the cost of the death of 20-30 people of its own civilian population - and bought in the total result of this exchange the loss by the enemy of 7-8 percent of his troops. These numbers, of course, Alexander and his commanders could not know in advance; but what the conversion of their own land “to the desert” means, it was clear even so, and that the population, whose dwellings and supplies were destroyed, was doomed to spend the winter on grazing in dugouts and die out in droves - this was also clear without any numbers and was calculated in advance by the emperor.

Napoleon called this method of war "new". In fact, however, it is not entirely unprecedented for that time, and not too old for ours. In 334 B.C. the Greek Memnon, a mercenary commander in the Persian service, in the face of Alexander's invasion, suggested to the Persian governors of Asia Minor: “We must retreat, trample pasture with cavalry, burn crops and not even spare our cities; Alexander will not be able to stay in a country where there is no provisions. The Persian governors unanimously refused, referring to the fact that this was "unworthy of the spiritual greatness of the Persians"; one of them declared that he “would not allow even one house to burn down among his subjects,” the rest joined him (as reported by Arrian and Diodorus). By the measure of the Achaemenids, as we see, the strategy of imp. Alexandra was too criminal baseness towards her own population to be allowed to be used; but the Christian Petersburg Empire treated the disasters of its population much easier than the government of the pan-Asian despot two and a half millennia earlier ...

A few more words from myself, instead of an epilogue. In 1829, Count Rumyantsev, who owned Tarutino, decided to thank his men for their contribution to the victory over the adversary. He gave them freedom, but with one small condition. In exchange for the will, the count ordered the men to chip in on the monument military glory 1812. So, a trifle: 44 thousand rubles. To understand how much in question, I will only say that a cow in those days cost twelve rubles. Like this: first they deprived their houses, left them in the cold, and then turned out their pockets...

But on the other hand, the patriotic monument in the form of a pillar crowned with an eagle still stands today.

To this we can add the works of Yevgeny Ponasenkov about the war of 1812, well presented on the net.

TO THE QUESTION ABOUT "Scorched Earth Tactics"

During the period of tense defensive battles near Moscow, the directive of the command of the Western Front of October 30, 1941 prescribed:
"Destroy all highways adjacent to the front line of defense, and highways that the enemy uses for his maneuver to a depth of 50 km. Maintain destruction continuously. Be sure to destroy all bridges. Minify all tank-hazardous directions with anti-tank mines and bottles with a combustible mixture. In possible directions infantry attacks, immediately place anti-personnel minefields, barbed wire, blockages, barricades and prepare fire barriers.
Similar demands are not hard to find among archival documents and other fronts. These are, one might say, classic methods of armed struggle. The war on transport communications and the mining of areas of terrain easily accessible to the enemy have their own history, rich in various examples. For these tactics, the armed forces of most states of the world have special troops.
During the years of the Great Patriotic War, perhaps for the first time since the existence of the Russian and Soviet armies other methods of destruction tactics were also used - the total destruction during the retreat of everything that could be destroyed, including settlements. Residents of villages and villages located in the front line were subject to forcible eviction.
The damage caused by the German invaders to the national economy and citizens of the USSR has been carefully calculated. His summary indicators were previously announced at the Nuremberg trials. By 1959, the data was clarified. In the statistical collection "The National Economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." (M., 1990) says the following:
"The Nazi invaders completely or partially destroyed and burned 1,710 cities and towns and more than 70,000 villages and villages; burned and destroyed over 6 million buildings and made about 25 million people homeless; destroyed 31,850 industrial enterprises, disabled metallurgical plants, where about 60% of steel was smelted before the war, mines, which provided over 60% of coal production in the country, destroyed 65 thousand km of railway track and 4100 railway stations, 36 thousand post and telegraph institutions, telephone exchanges and other communication enterprises destroyed and plundered tens of thousands of collective farms and state farms, slaughtered, seized or drove to Germany 7 million horses, 17 million cattle, 20 million pigs, 27 million sheep and goats. In addition, they destroyed and defeated 40 thousand hospitals and other medical institutions, 84 thousand schools, technical schools, higher educational institutions, research institutes, 43 thousand public libraries.
Will the damage inflicted on the national economy and population by the orders of the leading officials of our state and the army be so scrupulously calculated, and how can it be fairly correlated with the given statistics and the requirements of necessity?
Judging by the documents, ill-conceived prescriptions, from which their own citizens suffered first of all, entered practice at the very beginning of the war, and were legalized during the Battle of Moscow.

DECISION OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT
ON ORGANIZATION OF HARVESTING AND ELIMINATION OF THE HARVEST OF AGRICULTURAL CROPS IN THE SMOLENSK REGION

№ 0012

Smolensk Regional Committee of the CPSU (b)
Smolensk Regional Council of Workers' Deputies
Copies: Military Councils of the armies and military commissars of groups on a special list

THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT DECIDES: 1. To propose to the Smolensk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Regional Council of People's Deputies to immediately organize the implementation of the directive of the State Defense Committee regarding the sowing of industrial crops, grain crops and potatoes in the front line up to the border determined by the following settlements: Bely, Komary , railway [road] from st. Nikitinka to st. mountains Dorogobuzh, Podmoshye, Oselye, Pavlikovo, Spas-Demensk (exclusively), Dobroselye, Krapivna, Ekimovichi (exclusively), Roslavl, Ershichi.
2. Organize on the territory specified in paragraph 1 the immediate mowing of ripe and unripe grain crops and the digging of potatoes, beets and other crops for collective farms, state farms and other state organizations and the transfer of mowed and threshed grain and harvested potatoes to state organizations under the authority of the Smolensk Regional Council of Deputies workers, and military units Red Army, leaving at the disposal of each collective farmer one and a half - two hectares for farming grain crops and potatoes. All cleaning work to be completed by 15.8.41.
3. Destroy the crops of all other immature crops by mowing, feeding, trampling by livestock and in other ways until 15.8.41.
4. To oblige all local party and Soviet organizations to freely transfer fodder and potatoes to units and formations of the Red Army, both in processed form and on the vine, at their request, sealed and signed by the commander and commissar of the unit and formation.
5. To oblige the Military Councils of the armies and commanders - commissars of groups to give appropriate orders for the organization and implementation of this work to local party and Soviet organizations, military units within a precisely specified period, while at the same time establishing strict control over the implementation of this resolution.

TsAMO USSR. F. 208. Op. 2524. D. 2. L. 554

ON THE EVACUATION OF THE POPULATION FROM THE FRONT STRIP

№ 0507

Military Councils of the armies

By order of the Military Council of the Western Front dated August 12, 1941, No. 017, a 5-kilometer combat zone was established, from the territory of which the entire civilian population is to be evicted. Despite the clarity and necessity of this event, many commanders and commissars of units and formations did not understand the essence of this order and allow the population to remain in the combat zone, which, in essence, contributes to the penetration of spies and saboteurs into the environment of the local population, the recruitment of spies from part of the local population hostile to the Soviet regime.
For example:
a) in the villages closest to the location of the 316 rifle division, during an enemy air raid, part of the population came out with white flags and banners;
b) in the area of ​​1077th [rifle] regiment, a spy was detained with fascist leaflets distributed among the population and units of the Red Army;
c) in the area of ​​the 1306th [rifle] regiment, among the inhabitants of the [village] of Novo-Petrovskoye, a local resident Kuznetsov was exposed as a spy;
d) counter-revolutionary handwritten leaflets were found in the area of ​​the 4th tank brigade and were scattered among the units of the Red Army.
All these facts once again indicate the need for a clear implementation of the order of the Western Front dated August 12 of this year No. 017.

I ORDER: 1. To be strictly guided in the eviction of the civilian population from the 5-kilometer zone of hostilities by order of the Military Council of the Western Front No. 017 of August 12, 1941.
2. All citizens who resist eviction should be arrested and handed over to the NKVD.
3. To implement this order, involve local authorities and employees of special departments of associations and units.
4. The control over the implementation of the measures noted in the order is entrusted to the members of the Military Councils and the heads of the political departments of the armies.
Report to me about the implementation of order No. 017 in regular political reports.

TsAMO USSR. F. 325. Op. 5045. D. 4. L. 1-2

FROM THE ORDER OF THE STAFF OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND

№ 0428

<...>I ORDER: 1. Destroy and burn to the ground all settlements in the rear of the German troops at a distance of 40-60 km in depth from the front line and 20-30 km to the right and left of the roads.
To destroy settlements within the specified radius, immediately drop aircraft, widely use artillery and mortar fire, teams of scouts, skiers and trained sabotage groups equipped with Molotov cocktails, grenades and explosives.
<...>
3. In the event of a forced withdrawal of our units in one sector or another, take the Soviet population with them and be sure to destroy all settlements without exception so that the enemy cannot use them.

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5864. D. 1. L. 27

REPORT OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONER OF THE 53rd CAVALRY DIVISION

Member of the Military Council of the 16th Army
divisional commissioner LOBACHEV

In your letter No. 018, you indicate that we are not fulfilling the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Red Army to destroy everything that can be used by the enemy, and that we are showing unnecessary and harmful liberalism in this matter.
I must note that before receiving the order from the Headquarters on this issue, we really showed liberalism and the enemy was left bread, housing, etc.
Now in parts of our division this is not the case. On November 19 and 20 alone, we burned down four settlements:
The ridge - only a few unburned houses remained, Mal[oe] Nikolskoye - completely, the village of Lesodolgorukovo and Denkhovo - the result of the fire is not yet known to me, but I personally observed how these settlements were engulfed in flames.
For this purpose, we create special groups of fighters who prepare in advance and destroy [buildings] immediately upon leaving this settlement by our troops.
Your instructions in the future will be carried out with even greater perseverance. For patrols, during raids on the enemy by separate detachments, this will be given as a special task in order to destroy everything that could [could] remain [for the enemy].

TsAMO USSR. F. 358. Op. 5914. D. 1. L. 13

REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORDER OF THE STATE NO. 0428 AS OF 25.11.41

№0324

№ pp	Item names	By what means [destroyed] and the degree of destruction
1	2	3

1.	GOROBOVO	Destroyed by artillery
2.	ZAOVRAZHIE	--"--
3.	SHARAPOVKA	Burnt down by troops
4.	VELKINO	--"--
5.	ELBOW	--"--
6.	Ignatievo	--"--
7.	Pos. them. KAGANOVICH	--"--
8.	SERGIEVO	--"--
9.	SPASSKOE	--"--
10.	ANASHKINO	--"--
11.	IVANEVO	--"--
12.	DYAKONOVO	--"--
13.	KAPANY	--"--
14.	HAMSTERS	--"--
15.	LYAHOHO	--"--
16.	BRYKINO	5-6 houses left
17.	YAKSHINO	Burnt down by troops
18.	BOLDINO	Only stone buildings remain
19.	YEREMINO	7-8 houses left
20.	KRYMSKOE and svh. DUBKI	Burnt down completely by the troops
21.	NARO-OSANOVO	--"--
22.	Krivosheino	Partially burnt
23.	ANALSHINO	--"--
24.	KOLYUBYAKINO	--"--
25.	TOMSHINO	--"--
26.	PICTURE	--"--
27.	MASEEVO	--"--
28.	KOZHINO	--"--
29.	MAXIHA	Partially burnt and destroyed
30.	DUBROVKA	Partially burnt
31.	SUKHAREVO	--"--
32.	MOLODEKOVO	--"--
33.	MAURINO	--"--
34.	State Farm GOLOVKOVO	--"--
35.	SKUGROVO	--"--
36.	LOOKING OUT	--"--
37.	TUCHKOVO	--"--
38.	MUKHINO	--"--
39.	MOUSE	--"--
40.	PETROVO	--"--
41.	TRUTEEVO	--"--
42.	MIKHAILOVSKOE	--"--
43.	LARGE SEEDS	Burnt down by troops
44.	VASILEVSKOE	--"--
45.	GRIGOROVO	Partially burnt
46.	HOTYAZHI	--"--
47.	APARINA MOUNTAIN	--"--
48.	BEREZHKI	--"--
49.	ULITINO	--"--
50.	POKROVSKOE	--"--
51.	KARINSKOE	--"--
52.	MOUTH	Partially burnt
53.	KOLYUBAKOVO	--"--

In addition, 9 sabotage groups of 2-3 people were organized and sent to the rear of the enemy with the task of setting fire. Neither group has yet returned. The main means [of destruction] of these groups are bottles of KS and gasoline.
The bridges located on the MOZHAYSKY and MINSK highways from LYAKHOVO to KRUTITSA have been blown up.
Deputy chief of the operational department lieutenant colonel PEREVERTKIN TsAMO USSR. F. 326. Op. 5045. D. 1. L. 62-63

ORDER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT
ON THE ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE IN SETTLEMENTS

№ 01126

The experience of past military operations shows that the troops of the front often left settlements without taking advantage of their positive properties for combat. Settlements, especially those with strong stone buildings and fences, in addition to camouflaging the troops, give them protection from bullets, shrapnel, tanks and armored vehicles of the enemy.
The commanders of formations and units in a number of cases, not taking into account these properties and fearing "encirclement", did not take any measures to adapt settlements for stubborn battle and inflict the greatest damage on the enemy.
In the future, strongly demand from the personnel:
1. It is obligatory to use and adapt to the defense all settlements of operational or tactical importance as strongholds in the defense system.
2. Defended settlements are primarily adapted for anti-tank and anti-artillery defense<...>.
3. Barricade all streets adapted to the defense of the settlement, using local means and materials for barricades, regardless of damage <...>.
4. For the disposal of personnel and firing points in the defense, first of all, adapt strong stone buildings that allow longitudinal flanking fire<...>.
5. In the struggle for settlements, the role of the commander is especially responsible, as the organizer and head of defense, entrusted to the unit - part of the site or sector<...>.
6. Simultaneously with the adaptation of the settlement to the defense, draw up a plan and carry out preparations to destruction by destruction or burning of all vital centers, buildings and stocks of products and materials in case of forced abandonment of the settlement.

Correct: Head of the 2nd Department of the Engineering Directorate of the Western Front, military engineer 2nd rank GORBUNOV

TsAMO USSR. F. 326. Op. 5045. D4. L. 7-9

FROM A SPECIAL REPORT OF THE CHEMICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE 5th ARMY OF THE WESTERN FRONT
ON THE ACTIONS OF THE FLAME-THROWER UNIT

Head of the chemical troops of the Western Front

In addition, in a separate summary, I report the actual data on the work of the 26th company of the FOG, the firing shaft and the effectiveness of the bottles [KS] in the area of ​​the 32nd [rifle] D[iviziya].<...>
The village of AKULOVO was burnt with bottles. CS has been used up. The arson was carried out by the fighters of the chemical platoon of the 17th [rifle] regiment, headed by the head of the chemical service, senior lieutenant EGOROV, and the commander of the department, comrade. KVASHIN.
<...>bottles burned 27 houses.
<...>

TsAMO USSR. F. 326. Op. 5045. D. 1. L. 101-102

REPORT OF THE HEAD OF THE MOZHAYSKY SECTOR OF THE NKVD
ON THE DESTRUCTION OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE REAR OF THE ENEMY

Member of the Military Council of the Western Front
comrade Bulganin

In accordance with your instructions for the destruction of settlements occupied by the enemy, the Mozhaisk sector [NKVD] did the following:
The sabotage groups of the NKVD, transferred over the front line, were set on fire: ROGATINO, ZABOLOTE, USATKOVO, ARKHANGELSKOYE, VOLCHENKI, KOVRIGINO, GORBOVO.
Agent groups of the sector set fire to: KRIVO-SHEINO, NOVAYA DEREVNYA, KHAUSTOVO, OGARKOVO and PAVLOVKA.
In addition, in the deep rear of the enemy, agents destroyed Smolensk region: in the village of RED LUCH, a school where the Germans were stationed, and near the city of KOZELSK, the former hostel of a glass factory, where the Germans were also housed.
The agents sent by us to destroy DOROHOVO, VEREY and some other points have not yet returned, and therefore the results of this task are unknown.

TsAMO USSR. F. 208. Op. 2524. D. 18. L. 88

On the night of November 27-28, 1941, in the village of Petrishchevo, a fighter of the Soviet sabotage and reconnaissance group of Arthur Sprogis - Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, set fire to a peasant residential building where German soldiers and a stable were located .. She was captured by local peasants and handed over to the Germans, who her then hung up..

ORDER OF THE STATE OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND No. 0428

Moscow city.

The experience of the last month of the war showed that the German army is poorly adapted to war in winter conditions, does not have warm clothes and, experiencing enormous difficulties from the onset of frost, huddles in the front line in populated areas. The enemy, arrogant to the point of impudence, was going to spend the winter in warm houses Moscow and Leningrad, but this was prevented by the actions of our troops. On vast sectors of the front, the German troops, having met stubborn resistance from our units, were forced to go on the defensive and deployed in settlements along the roads for 2.0 - 30 km on both sides. German soldiers live, as a rule, in cities, towns, villages, in peasant huts, sheds, rigs, baths near the front, while the headquarters of the German units are located in larger settlements and cities, hiding in basements, using them as shelter from our aircraft and artillery.

To deprive the German army of the opportunity to deploy in villages and cities, drive the German invaders out of all settlements into the cold in the field, smoke them out of all rooms and warm shelters and make them freeze in the open air - such is an urgent task, the solution of which largely depends on the acceleration of the defeat of the enemy and the disintegration of his army.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ORDERS:

1. Destroy and burn to the ground all settlements in the rear of the German troops at a distance of 40-60 km in depth from the front line and 20-30 km to the right and left of the roads. To destroy settlements within the indicated radius of action, immediately drop aircraft, make extensive use of artillery and mortar fire, teams of scouts, skiers and guerrilla sabotage groups equipped with Molotov cocktails, grenades and explosives.

2. In each regiment, create teams of hunters of 20-30 people each to blow up and burn settlements in which enemy troops are stationed. To select the most courageous and politically and morally strong fighters, commanders and political workers in the hunting teams, carefully explaining to them the tasks and significance of this event for the defeat German army. Outstanding daredevils for courageous actions to destroy the settlements in which the German troops are located, to present to the government award.

3. In the event of a forced withdrawal of our units in one sector or another, take the Soviet population with them and be sure to destroy all settlements without exception so that the enemy cannot use them. First of all, for this purpose, use the teams of hunters allocated in the regiments.

4. The military councils of the fronts and individual armies systematically check how the tasks for the destruction of settlements in the radius indicated above from the front line are being carried out. Headquarters every 3 days to report in a separate summary how many and which settlements have been destroyed over the past days and by what means these results have been achieved.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

I. STALIN