When the war ended in the Far East. Both front and rear: what was the Far East for the country during the Great Patriotic War
LAST BATTLE IN TRANSBAIKAL AND PRIMORYE
In the Far East, the Red Army was opposed not by parts of the white movement and nationalist regimes that were defeated in 1919, but by the 175,000-strong army of Japan. Under these conditions, the Soviet government decided to create on April 6, 1920, a buffer democratic state - the Far Eastern Republic (FER), closely connected with the RSFSR. The FER included the Trans-Baikal, Amur, Primorsk, Sakhalin, and Kamchatka regions. G. Kh. Eikhe, who had previously commanded the 5th Army of the Soviet troops in Siberia, was appointed head of the People's Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the FER. Parts of the NRA during 1920 led fighting with the troops of Ataman Semenov and Kappel's detachments, which controlled a significant part of the territory of the Far East. Only as a result of the third offensive on October 22, 1920, units of the NRA took Chita with the support of partisans.
With the help of the Kappel and Semenovites who retreated from Transbaikalia, Japan fortified itself in Primorye, where on May 26, 1921, the power of the Primorsky Regional Administration was overthrown and the pro-Japanese government of S. D. Merkulov was created. At the same time, units of R. F. Ungern invaded Transbaikalia from Mongolia. In the current difficult situation, the Soviet government provided military, economic and financial assistance to the Far East. Eikhe was replaced by V. K. Blyukher as commander of the NRA FER. In June, Ungern retreated to Mongolia, where in August 1921 most of his troops were surrounded and destroyed by units of the NRA. In the autumn of 1921, the situation escalated again, but in the end, as a result of fierce fighting near Volochaevka (January-February 1922), in a 40-degree frost, units of the NRA turned the tide and returned the previously lost Khabarovsk. The further offensive of the NRA units (new commander I.P. Uborevich) took place in October 1922. On October 25, the NRA troops entered Vladivostok, and on November 14, 1922, the People's Assembly of the Far East Republic announced the establishment of Soviet power in the Far East and the entry of the Far East into composition of the RSFSR. Soviet power established itself in all regions where civil war had flared before.
I.S. Ratkovsky, M.V. Khodyakov. History of Soviet Russia
"THROUGH THE VALLEYS AND TOWARDS THE HILLS": THE HISTORY OF THE SONG
The biography of Peter Parfyonov, which is closely connected with Siberia, is amazing. He managed to combine the talents of a poet, writer, historian, military figure, diplomat, head of a major Russian government department and party functionary.
Perhaps his name would have long been forgotten if it were not for the famous song composed by him “Across the valleys and over the hills”.
Petr Parfyonov, in the article “The History of the Partisan Song”, recalled:
“The song“ In the valleys, in the mountains ”has long history. The text has been revised by me several times. The song took its final form under the following circumstances.
After the liquidation of Kolchakism and the liberation of Vladivostok, the political commissioner (as the military commissars were then called - A.M.) under the head of the Nikolsko-Ussuriysk garrison made a report on the political and moral state of the military units, pointed out the complete absence of good revolutionary songs.
“For five months now we have been standing, and our Red Army soldiers are singing Kolchak's Canary, and we can offer them nothing in return. It's a disgrace, comrades!" the delegate said.
Taking advantage of the next Sunday afternoon, when there was less operational work, I found my notebook with verses and, borrowing from it the melody, theme, form and a significant part of the text, wrote in one evening new song"Partisan Anthem":
In the valleys, in the mountains
Divisions went forward
To take Primorye with a fight -
Stronghold of the White Army.
To drive out the invaders
Outside your native country.
And do not bend before their agent
Labor of his back.
Standing under the banner
Created a military camp
Remote squadrons
Amur partisans.
Glory will not cease these days
Will never forget
How dashing is our lava
Occupied cities.
Preserved, just like in a fairy tale
Age-old like stumps
Stormy nights of Spassk,
Nikolaev days.
How we drove the chieftains,
How we smashed the gentlemen.
And in the Pacific
Your trip is over."
Later it turned out that the legendary "Partisan Song" had other predecessors. Yuri Biryukov, a researcher of Russian song history, revealed that back in 1915 a collection of poems “The Year of War. Thoughts and Songs” by Vladimir Gilyarovsky, the famous Moscow reporter “Uncle Gilyai”. One of his poems “From the taiga, the taiga far away” became a song that was sung in the Russian army. The song was subtitled "Siberian Riflemen in 1914":
From the taiga, the dense taiga,
From the Amur, from the river,
Silently, a formidable cloud
Siberians went to battle...
And in last years The “March of the Drozdovsky Regiment” was published, which is considered the first double of the “Song of the Siberian Riflemen” in terms of appearance. The words of the “Drozdovsky March” were composed by P. Batorin in memory of the 1,200-verst-long transition of the 1st separate brigade of Russian volunteers under the command of Colonel Drozdovsky from Romania, where they were caught by the revolution, to the Don.
Trekking from Romania
There was Drozdovsky glorious regiment,
To save the people
Carried heroic heavy duty.
So, two different songs were born for one motive: “red” and “white” (since later Drozdovsky’s brigade fought with weapons in their hands against the Bolsheviks), which often happened in those days of a tragic break in the life of Russia. There is also pathos in the song of the Drozdovites, but the people demand salvation in the name of holy Russia:
The Drozdovites walked with a firm step,
The enemy fled under pressure:
Under the tricolor Russian flag
The regiment gained glory for itself!
Both songs remained in history, in songbooks, although the original source was forgotten for a long time. And the song of Pyotr Parfyonov, which became a kind of symbol of the era, gained world fame. civil war. The words from this song are minted on the monuments of partisan glory in Vladivostok, in Khabarovsk:
Glory will not cease these days,
Will never fade.
Partisan detachments
They occupied the cities...
ICE EPILOGUE OF THE CIVIL WAR
While living in Harbin, in the spring of 1922, General Pepelyaev entered into relations with two delegates from the population of the Yakutsk region who rebelled against the Bolsheviks: P. A. Kulikovsky and V. M. Popov, who arrived in Vladivostok to seek support from the government of S. D. Merkulov. This government, however, did not show an active interest in Yakut affairs, and the delegates then managed to interest General Pepelyaev in them, who, after long requests and insistence, agreed to help the people of Yakutia in their fight against the communists. Deciding to organize a military expedition to this distant Siberian region, A.N. Pepelyaev moved to Vladivostok in the summer of 1922.
Persons and institutions that had nothing to do with either the Japanese or the Merkulov government helped Kulikovsky and Pepelyaev to prepare food, uniforms and weapons for the expeditionary detachment. Recruitment gave the gene. Pepelyaev up to 700 volunteers, mostly former soldiers of his Siberian army and Kappelevites.
On September 1, 1922, when General Dieterichs already held power in Primorye, Pepelyaev's detachment was ready to leave Vladivostok. It received the name of the Siberian Volunteer Squad, but officially it was an expedition to protect the Okhotsk-Kamchatka coast.
To send a detachment to the ports Sea of Okhotsk two ships were chartered.
Upon the arrival of the expedition to the place, it turned out that the popular anti-Soviet movement in the Yakutsk region had already been liquidated by the Bolsheviks. According to one of the participants in the campaign, the help of the Siberian Volunteer Squad was at least three months late.
General Pepelyaev now faced the question of whether to create a new anti-Bolshevik movement in Yakutia or immediately return to Vladivostok. A meeting was arranged with local people who assured Pepelyaev that it was easy to create a movement in the region again, since there were still many partisan detachments is located in the taiga, and it will be enough for the squad to move forward, as it will quickly be strengthened by new volunteers.
Even before the arrival of General Vishnevsky in Ayan, Gen. Pepelyaev, with a detachment of 300 fighters, went to Nelkan to take the local red garrison by surprise there with its food and weapons supplies and shipping facilities. The detachment had to travel a distance of 240 versts through deserted terrain and on the way cross the difficult Dzhukdzhur Range, which during the autumn thaw, with insufficient means of transportation, was an extremely difficult task.
Nevertheless, this path was passed, and the detachment reached Nelkan, but three defectors warned the Reds about the approach of the enemy, and they managed to sail away on barges along the May River to Aldan.
Thus, the squad was forced to settle down for the winter at two points: in Nelkan, with General Pepelyaev, and in Ayan, with General Vishnevsky ... On November 19, a detachment from the port of Ayan, led by the gene, was able to approach Nelkan. Vishnevsky, and now only the third battalion of the squad remained in Ayan.
Pepelyaev's squad stayed in Nelkan for about a month, organizing their transport and collecting intelligence information. Information was received about the location of the red units in the area. It turned out that there were up to 350 red fighters in the Amga settlement, almost the same number in the villages of Petropavlovsky and Churapcha. In the regional city of Yakutsk, the number of red fighters was not found out. It was assumed that their main forces were here, led by the commander of all the red detachments in the region, Baikalov ...
On January 22, 1923, a detachment was sent from Ust-Mili to take the village of Amga, under the command of Colonel Renengart with a strength of up to 400 fighters with two machine guns ... The distance of 200 miles from Ust-Mil to Amga, the Renengart detachment passed at 40–50 ° along Réaumur in six days.
Amga was taken after a short resistance by the Reds ... This was the first success of the Whites, but the further development of the struggle brought them nothing but disappointment and serious disasters.
On February 12, information was received that the red garrison of the village of Petropavlovsky, under the command of Strodt, had withdrawn and went to Yakutsk. General Vishnevsky was sent to meet him with an instructor company and the 1st battalion, which was supposed to ambush and defeat the Reds while they were resting in one of the villages.
Strodt, however, learned of the proposed ambush and prepared to meet the enemy. In the Yakut ulus (village) Sigalsysy on February 13, a battle began ...
Strodt's detachment was surrounded; guards were posted around him in the forest. The Whites made an attempt to take Sigalsysy by storm, but the Reds developed destructive machine-gun fire, and this attempt was not successful.
In view of the impossibility of taking the enemy out of battle, the Whites decided not to lift the siege until the Reds, under the pressure of hunger, surrendered themselves. On February 25, information was received about the movement of the Churapchinsky Red Detachment to the rescue of Strodt. Gene. Pepelyaev sent part of his squad to meet this detachment, but again failed to destroy it.
Three days later, news came that a large detachment under the command of Baikalov himself had set out from Yakutsk. This detachment moved directly to Amga and on the morning of March 2 opened gun and machine-gun fire on it. The white defenders of Amga fired back from the Reds to the last bullet, then some of them retreated to Ust-Mili, some were captured by the enemy.
The situation has now changed drastically, not in favor of the Whites.
March 3 Gen. Pepelyaev ordered the retreat of his squad back to the village of Petropavlovsky, at the mouth of the Mai River. Among other things, the order said:
Having experienced severe hardships on the road, the retinue of Gen. Pepelyaev in early April. 1923 reached Nelkan. In total, about 600 people remained in the squad after the campaign against Yakutsk, including 200 Yakuts.
After resting in Nelkan, the detachment then went to Ayan on the shore of the Sea of Okhotsk. This was in the summer of 1923. Having learned about the exit of the detachment of General Pepelyaev to the sea, the red authorities of Primorye sent a military expedition on three ships from Vladivostok under the command of Vostretsov.
On the night of June 18, with a strong wind and a storm at sea, the Reds landed on the shore near Ayan and approached the port unnoticed, surrounding Pepelyaev's headquarters and its combat units. Vostretsov offered Pepelyaev to surrender without a fight, warning that otherwise his squad would be destroyed by force of arms.
There was no way out: Pepelyaev agreed to surrender ...
Pepelyaev and his most important associates were taken to Siberia, where they were tried in the city of Chita. The general himself and ten people from among those taken prisoner together were sentenced to death, but this sentence was later commuted to ten years in prison ...
Far Eastern grouping of Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War consisted of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces of the country. Organizationally, they were part of the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts. Pacific Fleet, Red Banner Amur Flotilla. Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal air defense zones of the country. Land and sea borders were guarded by border troops.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, taking into account the real danger of aggression from imperialist Japan, during almost the entire war was forced to keep from 32 to 59 settlement divisions in the Far East ground forces, from 10 to 29 aviation divisions and up to 6 divisions and 4 brigades of the Air Defense Forces of the country's territory with a total number of over 1 million soldiers and officers, 8 - 16 thousand guns and mortars, over 2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, from 3 to 4 thousand .combat aircraft and more than 100 warships of the main classes. In total, this amounted to 15 to 30 percent of the combat forces and means of all Soviet Armed Forces in different periods of the war (475) . Combat and strength of the Far Eastern grouping in 1941 - 1945. shown in tables 5 and 7.
Table 6. The combat composition of the Soviet troops in the Far East in 1941 - 1945 (476)
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In the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, from the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal fronts, the Stavka used 12 rifle, 5 tank and motorized divisions on the Soviet-German front - a total of over 122 thousand people, more than 2 thousand guns and mortars, 2209 light tanks , over 12 thousand cars, 1500 tractors and tractors. The Japanese high command closely followed the course of hostilities on the Soviet-German front and the grouping of Soviet troops in the Far East, trying to determine the most favorable moment for an attack on the USSR. This is evidenced by a document sent to the troops in early December 1941, when the German fascists stood at the walls of Moscow: “To complete the continuous preparations for operations against Soviet Union not only the Kwantung Army, but also every army and formations of the first line must make every effort to ensure that, observing the gradually occurring changes in the military situation of the Soviet Union and Mongolia, they should be able to establish the true situation at any moment. This applies especially to the present conditions, when it becomes more and more necessary to quickly establish the signs of a turning point in the situation” (481). Considering the threat of attack, the Headquarters used the Far Eastern forces and means on the Soviet-German front only in the most minimal quantities. From December 5, 1941 to April 30, 1942, only two rifle divisions were transferred there from the Trans-Baikal Front, and a cavalry regiment from the Far East. In the summer and autumn of 1942, when the Wehrmacht fiercely rushed to the Volga and the Caucasus, the Japanese command again prepared to strike at the Soviet Far Eastern border. It was during that period that the military operations of his armed forces were not active either in the Pacific Ocean or in China. Meanwhile, the attack Nazi German troops required new reserves. From May 1 to November 19, the Headquarters transferred 10 rifle divisions from the Far East to the Stalingrad and Southwestern Fronts, to the Bryansk Front - 4 rifle brigades with a total strength of about 150 thousand people, over 1600 guns and mortars, a large number of other weapons and combat technology. In the winter of 1942/43, only 1 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, 6 howitzer artillery brigades and 3 mortar regiments with a total number of about 35 thousand people, 557 guns and mortars, 32 light tanks and other weapons were transferred from the Far East to the Stavka reserve. In 1943, only 8 howitzer artillery brigades, formed in March-May, with a total number of about 9 thousand people, more than 230 large-caliber field guns, were transferred from the Far East to the Soviet-German front. The last regrouping of Soviet troops from the Far East was carried out during the summer-autumn campaign of 1944. These were an airborne brigade and four high-capacity howitzer artillery regiments. During the war years, 39 divisions, 21 brigades and 10 regiments were redeployed to the Headquarters reserve from the ground forces of this group. Their total strength amounted to about 402 thousand people, over 5 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks (482). An important role in the defeat of Nazi Germany belongs to the sailors of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla. In 1941, 12 naval rifle brigades were formed from their composition. More than 140,000 Pacific sailors fought in the ground forces on the Soviet-German front (483). In 1941 - 1944 operating Northern and Black Sea Fleets replenished with warships, as well as well-trained sailors and pilots of the Pacific Fleet (484). Thus, the Soviet Supreme Command, constantly taking care of strengthening the borders in the Far East, practically during the first three years of the war used the Far Eastern grouping as one of the sources of replenishment of the troops operating against Nazi Germany, creating new units and formations. The transfer of combat forces and means, weapons and military equipment from one theater of operations to another during the war clearly testifies to the great contribution of the Far Eastern troops to achieving victory over Nazi Germany. The main part of these forces and means was sent by the Headquarters to the Soviet-German front in the most difficult and crucial moments of the war against Germany. In the second half of 1943, when a radical change took place on the Soviet-German front in favor of the Soviet Union, and Italy fell out of the fascist bloc, it became clear to the whole world that sooner or later Germany and Japan would fall after her. The successes of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces changed the course of the entire Second World War and enabled the United States and Great Britain to intensify operations in the Pacific. Since that time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command almost did not attract the combat forces and means of the Far Eastern grouping to the Soviet-German front and began to carry out measures for its development. In August 1943, the Primorsky Group of Forces was formed as part of the Far Eastern Front (the 1st and 25th combined arms armies, all formations and units located in Primorye, as well as the 9th Air Army operationally subordinate to it). Gradually, the combat and numerical strength of the Far Eastern group increased, the troops were saturated with automatic and conventional small arms. Artillery, tank and aircraft fleets were replenished with new types of guns and vehicles, their logistics improved. In 1944, 11 rifle divisions, a mechanized corps headquarters, a mechanized brigade, several mechanically driven artillery regiments, and a field-type fortified area (485) were deployed. In February 1945, the General Staff, the central and main departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense were intensively preparing plans for the deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East, as well as concentrating the necessary amount of material and technical means there (486) . Calculations have shown that military-political goals can be achieved in a short time only if there are three powerful offensive groupings in the Far Eastern theater of operations and a significant superiority over the enemy in manpower and equipment. To do this, it was necessary to sharply increase the combat and numerical strength of the Far Eastern formations. The strategic deployment of troops in the Far East differed from the preparation of offensive operations in Europe in that it was carried out in advance and had two stages (initial and final), each of which solved different tasks. The initial stage, completed in the main in the autumn of 1941, was carried out in order to reliably secure the state border from possible Japanese aggression. On the territory of the two former border military districts, deployed in fronts, only covering troops were concentrated, but also forces and means capable of delivering an immediate retaliatory strike. Throughout the war with fascist Germany, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command systematically improved the defensive power of the Far Eastern group, almost doubling the number of its personnel. The final stage of the strategic deployment, in which both the troops stationed in this theater and those concentrated as a result of the regrouping, took part during the immediate preparation of the offensive campaign against Japan. Its goal was to create a new strategic front of armed struggle in a new theater of operations. Such important problems as ensuring the secrecy of the regrouping and concentration of troops in the corresponding strategic directions, covering their deployment, command and control of troops, and their comprehensive material and technical support were solved. At the end of February - March 1945, the General Staff approved plans for the deployment of troops in the Far East and their logistics (487) . March 14th State Committee Defense decided to strengthen the air defense of the Far East and Transbaikalia (488) . By a directive of March 19, the Stavka detached from the Far Eastern Front and subjugated the Primorsky Group of Forces, creating a third strategic direction for the deployment of troops (489). On March 26, the Supreme Command Headquarters assigned new tasks to the Far Eastern Front and the Primorsky Group of Forces to cover the deployment of troops (490). Taking into account the important role of the armored forces in the upcoming campaign, in March 1945 the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command began to upgrade the equipment of the tank formations of the Far East, which were armed only with obsolete T-26 and BT light slippers throughout the war. In all tank brigades, the first battalions were armed with T-34 tanks. The first tank regiments of the 61st and 111th tank divisions were transferred to the same armament. In total, it was planned to send 670 T-34 tanks (491) to the Far East. At the same time, a list of measures for the medical support of the Far Eastern campaign was approved. It was necessary to transfer 348 different medical units and institutions, create a reserve of personnel, supplies of materials and funds for medical care (492). In view of the fact that the main part of the troops and cargo was planned to be transported by rail, Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin instructed the People's Commissariat of Railways to prepare the eastern and Far Eastern railways for mass transportation. In February 1945, a check was made of the mobilization readiness of a number of highways of the Far East to ensure a wide flow of military traffic, and measures were outlined to increase their throughput (493) . At the beginning of 1945, the operational and technical condition of the eastern railways did not fully meet the requirements of the situation. There were many rotten sleepers on the Trans-Siberian Railway, more than 11 thousand pieces of worn or burst rails, which significantly limited the throughput of many sections. The subgrade on some lines needed to be strengthened, especially in the section along the shore of Lake Baikal, where even before the war work had begun, but not completed, on the construction of retaining walls and the repair of emergency tunnels (494) . Meanwhile in hard days During the war, all stocks of rails, sleepers, turnouts, a significant part of the locomotive fleet were sent to the western roads. There was also a shortage of skilled workers who were mobilized into the military operational departments and special formations of the People's Commissariat of Commissariat for Service to service the western roads. Despite the measures taken for the return of specialists, by the beginning of hostilities against militaristic Japan, about 20 thousand of them were missing on the railway lines of the Far East (495) . In the spring of 1945, the capacity of the Tomsk and Omsk railways and some lines of the Far East was increased. On April 13, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution "On measures to improve the operation of the railways of the Far East (Krasnoyarsk, East Siberian, Trans-Baikal, Amur, Far Eastern and Primorskaya)". In order to improve the management of the activities of these highways, the Special District of the Far East Railways was created, headed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Railways V. A. Garnyk. General A.V. Dobryakov became the authorized representative of the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the BOSO under the district. For some sections, it was necessary to increase the capacity from 12 to 38 pairs of trains. The People's Commissariat of Railways was charged with increasing the number of locomotives on the railways of the Far East: by May 1, 1945 - up to 2708, by July 1 - up to 2947, and by September 1 - up to 3107. To replenish the locomotive fleet of these roads from other highways and from the reserve 800 locomotives (496) were distilled. Of the 240 steam locomotives of the GKO reserve and 360 steam locomotives of the NKPS reserve, it was required to form 20 locomotive columns. The GKO resolution provided for the creation of significant coal reserves by reserving reserves, as well as replenishing the railways of Siberia and the Far East with qualified personnel. During the second quarter of 1945, it was planned to increase the number of skilled workers by 30 thousand people, including machinists by 2373, assistant machinists by 2916, locomotive mechanics by 3155, conductors by 2074, track workers by 8816 people (497). From April, units of three operational railway regiments and three operational departments from Poland and Romania began to enter the Special District of the Far East Railways; all special forces were returning from the southwestern highways. In total, there were over 14 thousand people (498) in these parts. At the disposal of the NKPS came 8,000 conscripts, recognized for health reasons as limited fit for military service. Two railway brigades and several special formations were sent for restoration work (499) . These works demanded enormous effort from the railroad workers. The main military transportation, both centralized and interfrontal, was carried out by rail in May - July, but they were most intensive in June. By August 9, their total volume amounted to 222,331 wagons (in terms of two-axle), including 127,126 wagons arrived in the Far East from the central regions of the country. Of this number, 74,345 wagons were received for the Trans-Baikal Front. 1st Far East - 31,100, 2nd Far East - 17,916, and 81,538 wagons were used to deliver military units and formations (operational transportation) (500). According to the types of troops, transportation was distributed as follows: 29.8 percent - for rifle troops, 30.5 percent - for artillery and armored vehicles, 39.7 percent - for aviation, engineering and other formations and units. The following facts testify to the intensity of the work of the railway: on average, in June - July, from 13 to 22 railway echelons arrived daily. Significant intra- and inter-front transportation was carried out through internal railway, water and highway-unpaved communications. The transfer of troops along them was carried out in a combined way: by transport and on foot. In May-August, 95,205 wagons passed along the railway tracks, transported water transport about 700,000 tons of cargo, 513,000 tons on dirt roads and 4,222 tons transferred by air. The main task of the railway units of the Trans-Baikal Front was the preparation of the main communications of the front - the single-track line Karymskaya - Borzya - Bayan-Tumen (Choibalsan). To do this, only in the weakest section of Borzya - Bayan-Tumen in June 1945, 13 sidings were built by the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front, the BOSO and railway workers. This made it possible to increase the capacity of the section from 7 to 18 pairs of trains per day (501) . The 3rd railway brigade arrived at the disposal of the 1st Far Eastern Front from Czechoslovakia, which launched work on the Primorskaya Railway to develop stations, a water supply system and strengthen the upper structure of the track. In the 2nd Far Eastern Front, the 25th railway brigade increased the capacity of the Amur and Far Eastern railways from 25 to 30 pairs of trains per day by the start of hostilities. Since the arriving forces were not enough, about 80 different recovery trains and flyers were formed, serviced by brigades of railway workers on the Amur, Primorskaya and Far Eastern roads (502). In total, in the spring and summer months of 1945, up to a million Soviet soldiers and officers (503), tens of thousands of artillery pieces, tanks, vehicles and many thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, food, uniforms were on the communications routes of Siberia, Transbaikalia and the Far East and other cargo. Throughout the entire length from Irkutsk to Vladivostok, the Trans-Siberian Railway was transferred to the operational group of the Logistics Directorate of the Soviet Army under the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. The fronts, on the other hand, used branches from the main highway leading to the borders of Manchuria and Korea. Their total length was 2700 km. The Trans-Baikal Front had 12 railway sections (504) for basing, the 2nd Far East - 9 and the 1st Far East - 8. In addition, more than 800 km of narrow-gauge railways built before the war on the territory of the MPR were used. Borzya station with a branch at Bayan-Tumen station (for the Trans-Baikal Front), Svobodny station with a branch in Khabarovsk (for the 2nd Far Eastern Front), Guberovo and Voroshilov stations (Ussuriysk) with a branch at Manzovka station ( for the 1st Far Eastern Front). The greatest load was planned for the line in the Trans-Baikal Front. Meanwhile, the capacity of the railway sections Karymskaya - Borzya, Borzya - Bayan-Tumen could not provide the required speed of movement. In this regard, the front command decided to send motorized units and mechanized artillery from the Karymskaya station under its own power. To do this, special groups of officers arrived in Irkutsk and Karymskaya, who distributed units on the spot to follow on their own and by rail (505) . Troops were delivered to Primorye by the Khabarovsk-Vladivostok railway, passing in separate sections 3-6 km from the state border. Therefore, the command of the 1st Far Eastern Front attached particular importance to the secrecy of transportation. Here, more often than on other fronts, in order to misinform the enemy, false transports of troops were carried out and false concentration areas were equipped. A huge volume of transportation could not be carried out only by railroads: it was necessary to build and repair unpaved highways. As a result, by August 9, the length of only military highways in the Far East exceeded 4.2 thousand km, of which it reached 2279 km on the Trans-Baikal Front, 1509 km on the 1st Far East, and 485 km on the 2nd Far East ( 506) . This greatly increased the ability to maneuver manpower and military equipment at the beginning of hostilities. In the prewar period, aviation in the Far East was not widely developed. During the war years, the length of overhead lines increased from 12 thousand km in 1941 to 18 thousand km in 1945, that is, 1.5 times; from July 1, 1941 to May 31, 1945, over 66 thousand passengers, 7 thousand tons of cargo and about 2 thousand tons of mail were transported. During the period of hostilities, the crews of the Far Eastern Directorate civil aviation made 439 sorties and transported more than 360 tons of defense cargo, as well as a significant number of passengers (507) . In preparation for the war with Japan, a large proportion of traffic fell on the Far Eastern Shipping Company. The tasks of the fleet were determined by the GKO decree of April 30, 1945. The People's Commissariat navy it was necessary to ensure the transportation of 123 thousand tons of cargo through the Far Eastern water basin in May, including coal - 40.6 thousand tons, fish - 10.3 thousand tons, salt - 10.7 thousand tons from Sakhalin Island, import cargoes from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky to Vladivostok - 18 thousand tons and various cargoes of Dalstroy - 17 thousand tons (508). The implementation of measures to ensure the concentration and deployment of troops in the Far East allowed the Soviet command to proceed with a direct regrouping of troops. Although the State Defense Committee decided on a broad transfer of units only on June 3, 1945 (509), in fact, it began even before the end of the final campaign in Europe. In April, the reserve front department of the former Karelian Front arrived in the Far East, which was entrusted with the command of the Primorsky Group of Forces (510). Until May 9, two field-type fortified areas (511) were sent from the Stavka reserve. From May 9 to May 31, the field administration of the 5th Army arrived there, three directorates of rifle corps with four rifle divisions (512). As a source of strategic deployment in the Far East, the Headquarters used the troops of four fronts that had completed combat operations on the Soviet-German front. The bulk of the regrouped troops were the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front: the directorate of the 5th and 39th combined arms armies, 6 directorates of rifle corps, 18 rifle and 2 anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 8 artillery and 2 rocket artillery brigades, or 60 percent of the total number formations of ground forces that arrived in the Far East. Frontal and 2 army directorates, 6 directorates of rifle, tank and mechanized corps, 10 rifle and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 15 brigades of the main military branches were sent from the 2nd Ukrainian Front; from the composition Leningrad Front the management of the breakthrough artillery corps and the mechanized corps, 6 divisions and 17 brigades of various branches of the ground forces arrived. The rest of the formations came from the 1st Belorussian Front (three rocket artillery brigades), the Moscow Military District (two tank brigades) and directly from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (reserve front management, three brigades and two fortified areas) (513) . A large number of rear units and institutions arrived in the Far East from other military districts. Such formations and formations were sent to the Far East that could successfully solve offensive tasks in the specific conditions of a theater of military operations. Determination of the expediency of using one or another connection depended on the experience and combat qualities accumulated in battles on the Soviet-German front. Thus, formations and units of the 5th and 39th armies, which participated in breaking through the fortified defensive zones in East Prussia, were intended to break through in the main directions of the border fortified areas. The first - in the offensive zone of the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the second - on the Trans-Baikal Front. Formations of the 6th Guards Tank and 53rd combined arms armies, which had extensive experience in operations in the mountain-steppe terrain, were included in the Trans-Baikal Front for an offensive in the wide desert expanses and mountain-wooded massifs of Manchuria. The regrouping of such significant forces and means in a short time and over vast distances required its careful organization both on the part of higher authorities and directly at the places of deployment of troops. Since the Japanese kept large forces on the border with the Soviet Union, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures in advance to reliably cover the lines of communication, areas of concentration and deployment of troops from possible strikes (514) . To ensure the secrecy of mass rail transportation, the admission of persons to their planning, control and accounting both in the General Staff and in the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Soviet Army was limited; it was forbidden to conduct correspondence and negotiations related to the redeployment of troops, the stations for unloading and servicing echelons were numbered; the transmission of reports on the movement of echelons was strictly controlled by the VOSO officers. Military equipment on railway platforms was camouflaged (515) . The troops were unloaded, as a rule, at night, after which they were immediately withdrawn to the area of concentration. The deployment of strike groups was carried out so covertly that at the beginning of the Manchurian operation, complete surprise was achieved. The command of the Kwantung Army knew about the movements of Soviet troops that began in the spring, but they did not expect that the Soviet Union would complete this major regrouping of the Armed Forces so soon (516) . Data on the number of forces and means of the ground forces that arrived in the Far East from May to August 8, 1945, are shown in Table 8. The table shows that the strategic regrouping of troops reached its highest limit in July, when 51.1 percent of the ground forces, 52.2 percent of artillery and 58 percent of armored weapons arrived in the Far East from the ground forces. In three months, the number of settlement divisions increased from 59.5 to 87.5, that is, 1.5 times, and the number of personnel of the entire group of troops - from 1,185,000 to 1,747,000 people. Table 8. The number of ground forces regrouped from the west during the period of strategic deployment in the Far East (517)
In total, during the period of strategic deployment, 2 front and 4 army directorates, 15 directorates of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 36 rifle, artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 53 brigades of the main branches of the ground forces and 2 fortified areas were regrouped, which amounted to a total complexity of 30 settlement divisions. In addition, the management of the 6th bomber aviation corps and 5 aviation divisions arrived. The air defense of the Far East received 3 air defense corps of the country's territory. The average staffing of units and formations was about 80 percent (518). The troops that joined the Far Eastern group were armed with more than 600 rocket launchers, as well as 900 heavy, medium tanks and self-propelled guns. The importance and expediency of the regrouping carried out to achieve victory in the war in the Far East in 1945 is evidenced by a well-known historical example. One of the reasons for the defeat tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was the inability of the Russian command to transfer in a short time to the Far East the necessary human reserves, weapons, ammunition and other types of materiel. The growth of combat forces and assets in the Far East, as well as the remoteness of this theater of operations, required the improvement of the strategic organs of the military leadership of the Far Eastern grouping of troops. In order to coordinate the actions of the troops and the navy, as early as May 1945, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to create the High Command in the Far East, the Military Council and headquarters under it. At the end of June, a group of generals and officers headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky left for the Far East. This group launched work in Chita (519). By a decision of July 30, the Headquarters formalized the creation of a special body top management- the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, and by the directive of August 2 - the headquarters of the High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, which have actually been operating since the beginning of July. Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky was appointed commander-in-chief, General I.V. Shikin was appointed a member of the Military Council, and General S.P. Ivanov (520) was appointed chief of staff. Coordination of the actions of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Flotilla with the troops was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov. Aviation operations were led by the Commander of the Air Force Chief Marshal Aviation A. A. Novikov. Under the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, an operational logistics group was created, headed by the Deputy Chief of the Logistics of the Soviet Army, General V. I. Vinogradov. It included a group of rear headquarters officers, representatives of the Central Directorate of Military Communications, the Main Automobile Directorate, the Main Road Directorate, the fuel supply, food and clothing supply departments, the Main Military Sanitary Directorate and the Main Trophy Directorate (521). On August 5, 1945, the Supreme Command Headquarters renamed the Primorsky Group of Forces into the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the Far Eastern Front into the 2nd Far Eastern (522). At the same time, the coastal and Far Eastern directions (523) that existed as part of the operational department of the General Staff were also renamed. By August 9, 1945, the Trans-Baikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts were deployed in the Far East, with the troops of which the 9th, 10th and 12th air armies, as well as the forces of the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur military flotilla, were to interact. Air defense was carried out by the Primorsky, Amur and Trans-Baikal air defense armies of the country's territory. Border Troops of Primorsky. For the first time in their history, the Khabarovsk and Trans-Baikal border districts were supposed to perform tasks unusual for them: participating in front-line operations, liquidate enemy border cordons and posts, destroy its fortified strongholds, and subsequently take an active part in the pursuit of enemy troops and protect communications, headquarters, important facilities and rear areas. The Transbaikal Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, a member of the Military Council, General A. N. Tevchenkov, chief of staff, General M. V. Zakharov, consisted of the 17th, 36th, 39th and 53rd combined arms (commander generals L I. Danilov, A. A. Luchinsky, I. I. Lyudnikov, I. M. Managarov), 6th Guards Tank (commanded by General A. G. Kravchenko), 12th Air (commanded by General S. A. Khudyakov) of the armies and the horse-mechanized group of the Soviet-Mongolian troops (commander General I. A. Pliev, his deputy for the Mongolian troops, General Zh. Lkhagvasuren). The anti-aircraft cover of the troops of the front was carried out by army and divisional anti-aircraft artillery, as well as the Trans-Baikal Air Defense Army of the country's territory (commander General P. F. Rozhkov). By the beginning of hostilities, the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front consisted of 13 directorates of rifle, artillery, tank and mechanized corps, 39 divisions and 45 brigades (rifle, airborne, cavalry, artillery, mortar, rocket artillery, tank, mechanized, anti-aircraft and self-propelled artillery), 2 fortified areas and 54 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, 2 directorates of bomber aviation corps, 6 bomber divisions, 2 assault, 3 fighter, 2 transport and 7 separate aviation regiments. Horse-mechanized formations and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army consisted of 4 cavalry and aviation divisions, a motorized armored brigade, tank, artillery regiments and a communications regiment with a total strength of about 16 thousand people, 128 guns and mortars and 32 light tanks (524). The Trans-Baikal Air Defense Army of the country had 3 air defense divisions, 2 separate anti-aircraft artillery air defense regiments of railway echelons and a fighter aviation division. In total, the Trans-Baikal grouping of troops consisted of 648 thousand people, or 37.1 percent of the number of Soviet troops in the Far East. It was armed with 9668 guns and mortars, 2359 tanks and self-propelled guns, 369 rocket launchers and 1324 combat aircraft (525). The total length of the Trans-Baikal Front along the state border was 2300 km (526). The 1st Far Eastern Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union K. A. Meretskov, member of the Military Council General T. F. Shtykov, chief of staff General A. N. Krutikov, included the 1st Red Banner, 5th, 25th and 35th combined-arms armies (commanded by Generals A.P. Beloborodov, N.I. Krylov, I.M. Chistyakov, N.D. Zakhvataev), the Chuguev task force (commanded by General V.A. Zaitsev), the 10th mechanized corps (commander General I. D. Vasiliev) and the 9th Air Army (commanded by General I. M. Sokolov). The troops of the Primorsky Air Defense Army of the country's territory were stationed on the territory of the front (commander General A.V. Gerasimov). By August 9, the front command had control of 10 rifle and mechanized corps, 34 divisions, 47 brigades and 34 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, 14 fortified areas, a bomber aviation corps, 3 bomber, 3 fighter, 2 assault air divisions and 6 separate aviation regiments. The coastal air defense army of the country's territory included the directorate of the air defense corps, 2 air defense divisions, an anti-aircraft artillery division, and an anti-aircraft artillery brigade. 2 anti-aircraft artillery regiments and a fighter aviation division. In total, the coastal grouping had about 589 thousand people (33.7 percent), 11,430 guns and mortars, 274 rocket launchers, 1,974 slippers and self-propelled guns, and 1,137 combat aircraft (527). The length of the 1st Far Eastern Front was 700 km (528). The 2nd Far Eastern Front, commanded by General M.A. Purkaev, a member of the Military Council, General D.S. Leonov, the chief of staff, General F.I. Shevchenko, included the 2nd Red Banner, 15th and 16th combined arms ( Commanding Generals M. F. Terekhin, S. K. Mamonov, L. G. Cheremisov) and the 10th Air Army (commander General P. F. Zhigarev), the 5th Separate Rifle Corps (commander General I. Z. Pashkov ). The Amur Air Defense Army of the country's territory (commanded by General Ya. K. Polyakov) was also located within the front. The front included the directorates of 2 rifle corps, 12 rifle and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 4 rifle, 9 tank and 2 anti-tank brigades, 5 fortified areas, 34 separate regiments of the main branches of the ground forces, the command of the mixed aviation corps, bomber, 2 assault , 3 fighter and 2 mixed aviation divisions, 9 separate aviation regiments. The Amur Air Defense Army of the country's territory consisted of directorates of 2 air defense corps, 2 air defense divisions, 2 anti-aircraft artillery brigades, 2 separate anti-aircraft artillery regiments and a fighter aviation division. This grouping included 333,000 people (19.1 percent), 5,988 guns and mortars, 72 rocket launchers, 917 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,260 combat aircraft. The length of the 2nd Far Eastern Front reached 2130 km (529). The Pacific Fleet, commanded by Admiral I. S. Yumashev, a member of the Military Council, General S. E. Zakharov, and the chief of staff, Vice Admiral A. S. Frolov, had 2 cruisers, a leader, 12 destroyers, 19 patrol ships, 78 submarines, 52 minesweepers, 49 submarine chasers, 204 torpedo boats (530). The aviation of the fleet consisted of 1618 aircraft, of which 1382 were combat. The number of personnel is about 165 thousand people, the fleet had 2550 guns and mortars, as well as other weapons (531). The Pacific Fleet was based at Vladivostok, as well as Sovetskaya Gavan and Petropavlovsk. The Red Banner Amur Military Flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral N.V. Antonov, a member of the Military Council Rear Admiral M.G. Yakovenko, the chief of staff, Captain 1st Rank A.M. gunboats, 7 mine boats, 52 armored boats, 12 minesweepers, 36 minesweepers and a number of support vessels (532). Its aviation consisted of 68 combat aircraft. In addition, all patrol boats of the border guard on the Amur and Ussuri, as well as ships of the civil river shipping company, were subordinate to the commander of the flotilla. The flotilla included 12.5 thousand people, 199 anti-aircraft guns and mortars (533). The Red Banner Amur military flotilla was based at Khabarovsk, Malaya Sazanka on the Zeya River, Sretensk on the Shilka River and Lake Khanka. So, by August 9, 1945, 11 combined arms, tank and 3 air armies, 3 air defense armies of the country's territory, a fleet and a flotilla were deployed against the Japanese armed forces in the Far East. They included directorates of 33 corps, 131 divisions and 117 brigades of the main branches of service. The land border of the USSR was covered by 21 fortified areas. The total strength of the Soviet Far Eastern group and its weapons are shown in Table 9. Table 9. The number of personnel, weapons and military equipment of the Soviet group of forces in the Far East at the beginning of the war against Japan (534)
The grouping of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East was a force capable of crushing Japanese troops in Manchuria in a short time. It was based on soldiers and officers of formations and units who were in the Far East during the war, but were well trained in the course of lengthy combat training and knew the theater of operations, the nature of the enemy’s defense and the characteristics of the Japanese army. The personnel of the armies transferred from the west had extensive experience in operating against a strong enemy. The skillful use of these features significantly increased the striking power of the grouping and in many respects predetermined the success of the entire campaign. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
In February 1945, a conference was held in Yalta, which was attended by representatives of the countries that were part of Great Britain and the United States, managed to get the Soviet Union to agree to take a direct part in the war with Japan. In exchange for this, they promised him to return Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin, lost during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.
Termination of the peace treaty
At the time when the decision was made in Yalta, the so-called Neutrality Pact was in force between Japan and the Soviet Union, which was concluded back in 1941 and was supposed to be valid for 5 years. But already in April 1945, the USSR announced that it was breaking the treaty unilaterally. The Russo-Japanese War (1945), the reasons for which were that the Land of the Rising Sun had sided with Germany in recent years, and also fought against the allies of the USSR, became almost inevitable.
Such a sudden statement literally plunged the leadership of Japan into complete disarray. And this is understandable, because her position was very critical - the Allied forces inflicted significant damage on her in the Pacific Ocean, and industrial centers and cities were subjected to almost continuous bombardment. The government of this country was well aware that it was almost impossible to achieve victory in such conditions. But still, it still hoped that it would somehow be able to wear down and achieve more favorable conditions for the surrender of its troops.
The United States, in turn, did not count on the fact that they would get an easy victory. An example of this is the battles that unfolded for the island of Okinawa. About 77 thousand people fought here from Japan, and about 470 thousand soldiers from the United States. In the end, the island was taken by the Americans, but their losses were simply amazing - almost 50 thousand killed. According to him, if the Russo-Japanese War of 1945 had not begun, which will be briefly described in this article, then the losses would have been much more serious and could have amounted to 1 million soldiers killed and wounded.
Announcement of the outbreak of hostilities
On August 8, in Moscow, the document was handed over to the Japanese Ambassador to the USSR at exactly 17:00. It said that the Russo-Japanese War (1945) was actually starting the very next day. But since there is a significant time difference between the Far East and Moscow, it turned out that only 1 hour remained before the start of the offensive of the Soviet Army.
In the USSR, a plan was developed, consisting of three military operations: the Kuril, Manchurian and South Sakhalin. All of them were very important. But nevertheless, the Manchurian operation was the most large-scale and significant.
Side forces
On the territory of Manchuria, the Kwantung Army, commanded by General Otozo Yamada, opposed. It consisted of about 1 million people, more than 1 thousand tanks, about 6 thousand guns and 1.6 thousand aircraft.
At the time when the Russo-Japanese War of 1945 began, the forces of the USSR had a significant numerical superiority in manpower: only there were one and a half times more soldiers. As for equipment, the number of mortars and artillery exceeded the similar enemy forces by 10 times. Our army had 5 and 3 times more tanks and aircraft, respectively, than the corresponding weapons of the Japanese. It should be noted that the superiority of the USSR over Japan in military equipment consisted not only in its numbers. The equipment at the disposal of Russia was modern and more powerful than that of its opponent.
Enemy strongholds
All participants in the Russo-Japanese War of 1945 were well aware that sooner or later, but it had to start. That is why the Japanese created a significant number of well-fortified areas in advance. For example, we can take at least the Hailar region, where the left flank of the Trans-Baikal Front of the Soviet Army was located. Barrage structures on this site were built for more than 10 years. By the time the Russo-Japanese War began (August 1945), there were already 116 pillboxes, which were interconnected by underground passages made of concrete, a well-developed system of trenches and a significant number. This area was covered by Japanese soldiers, whose number exceeded the divisional one.
In order to suppress the resistance of the Hailar fortified area, the Soviet Army had to spend several days. Under war conditions, this is a short period, but during the same time the rest of the Trans-Baikal Front moved forward by about 150 km. Given the scale of the Russo-Japanese War (1945), the obstacle in the form of this fortified area turned out to be quite serious. Even when his garrison surrendered, the Japanese warriors continued to fight with fanatical courage.
In the reports of Soviet military leaders one can very often see references to the soldiers of the Kwantung Army. The documents said that the Japanese military specially chained themselves to the beds of machine guns so as not to have the slightest opportunity to retreat.
evasive maneuver
The Russo-Japanese War of 1945 and the actions of the Soviet Army were very successful from the very beginning. I would like to mention one outstanding operation, which consisted in a 350-kilometer throw of the 6th Panzer Army through the Khingan Range and the Gobi Desert. If you take a look at the mountains, they seem to be an insurmountable obstacle to the passage of technology. The passes that Soviet tanks had to pass were located at an altitude of about 2 thousand meters above sea level, and the slopes sometimes reached a steepness of 50⁰. That is why cars often had to zigzag.
In addition, the advancement of equipment was also complicated by frequent heavy rains, accompanied by flooding of rivers and impassable mud. But, despite this, the tanks still moved forward, and already on August 11 they overcame the mountains and reached the Central Manchurian Plain, in the rear of the Kwantung Army. After such a large-scale transition, the Soviet troops began to experience an acute shortage of fuel, so they had to arrange for additional delivery by air. With the help of transport aviation, it was possible to transport about 900 tons of tank fuel. As a result of this operation, more than 200 thousand Japanese soldiers were captured, as well as a huge amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition.
Height Defenders Sharp
The Japanese War of 1945 continued. On the sector of the 1st Far Eastern Front, Soviet troops encountered unprecedentedly fierce enemy resistance. The Japanese were well entrenched on the heights of Camel and Ostraya, which were among the fortifications of the Khotous fortified area. It must be said that the approaches to these heights were indented by many small rivers and were very swampy. In addition, wire fences and excavated scarps were located on their slopes. The firing points of the Japanese soldiers were cut down in advance right in the rocky granite rock, and the concrete caps protecting the bunkers reached a thickness of one and a half meters.
During the fighting, the Soviet command offered the defenders of Ostra to surrender. As an envoy to the Japanese, a man from among local residents, but they treated him extremely cruelly - the commander of the fortified area himself cut off his head. However, there was nothing surprising in this act. From the moment the Russo-Japanese War began (1945), the enemy basically did not go to any negotiations. When the Soviet troops finally entered the fortification, they found only dead soldiers. It is worth noting that the defenders of the height were not only men, but also women who were armed with daggers and grenades.
Features of military operations
The Russo-Japanese War of 1945 had its own specific features. For example, in the battles for the city of Mudanjiang, the enemy used kamikaze saboteurs against units of the Soviet Army. These suicide bombers tied themselves with grenades and threw themselves under tanks or at soldiers. There was also such a case when about two hundred "live mines" lay on the ground next to each other in one sector of the front. But such suicidal actions did not last long. Soon soviet soldiers became more vigilant and managed to destroy the saboteur in advance before he came close and exploded next to equipment or people.
Surrender
The Russo-Japanese War of 1945 ended on August 15, when the country's emperor Hirohito addressed his people on the radio. He stated that the country had decided to accept the terms of the Potsdam Conference and capitulate. At the same time, the emperor called on his nation to observe patience and unite all forces to build a new future for the country.
3 days after Hirohito's appeal, the call of the Kwantung Army command to its soldiers was heard on the radio. It said that further resistance is pointless and there is already a decision to surrender. Since many Japanese units did not have contact with the main headquarters, their notification continued for several more days. But there were also cases when fanatical military personnel did not want to obey the order and lay down their arms. Therefore, their war continued until they died.
Consequences
It must be said that the Russo-Japanese War of 1945 was truly of great not only military but also political significance. managed to completely defeat the strongest Kwantung Army and complete the Second world war. By the way, its official end is considered to be September 2, when the act of surrender of Japan was finally signed in Tokyo Bay right on board the battleship Missouri, owned by the United States.
As a result, the Soviet Union regained the territories that had been lost back in 1905 - a group of islands and part of the South Kuriles. Also, according to the peace treaty signed in San Francisco, Japan renounced any claims to Sakhalin.
The compilers of the Japanese "History of the Pacific War" note: "Since 1938, Japanese-Soviet relations have steadily deteriorated." The fact is that since that time the assistance of the Soviet Union to China has increased qualitatively. This annoyed Japan. The idea of probing the Soviet military power was formed in the army general staff, the main meaning of which was to determine the readiness of the USSR for a war with Japan. It was decided to test this by attacking the Soviet troops by mobilizing the nineteenth division of the Korean army, which was directly subordinate to the imperial headquarters. The idea was to deliver a strong blow in order to prevent the USSR from speaking out against Japan. The occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese army in the autumn of 1931 had an important impact on the subsequent development of Soviet-Japanese relations. The Soviet government understood that the presence of the Japanese armed forces on the border of the USSR would increase the danger of a military clash with them. Therefore, on the one hand, it condemned the Japanese aggression, on the other hand, it intensified its proposals to conclude a non-aggression pact, pointing out that its absence does not indicate Tokyo's intention to pursue a peace-loving policy. At that time, the USSR could not count on joint actions with the countries of the West to repulse the aggressive actions of Japan. Relations with Great Britain and France were tense, and the United States generally denied the USSR diplomatic recognition. The Soviet Union could not act alone against Japan. Tokyo had no doubts about the sincerity of the Soviet Union's desire to conclude a bilateral non-aggression pact. At the same time, Tokyo took into account that the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact could sow suspicion among the Western powers about Japan's strategy on the continent, induce them to resist its further expansion in Central and South China. At the same time, at the end of 1932, Emperor Hirohito of Japan approved the developed general staff The army prepared a plan for preparing a war against the USSR for 1933, which took into account the strategic position that had changed after the capture of Manchuria: in the event of a war, a vast part of Soviet territory east of Lake Baikal was subject to Japanese occupation.
The question of the war against the USSR was discussed in detail at the regular meeting of the leadership of the Japanese ground forces held in June 1933. Since it was difficult to implement such a program by 1936, the resumption of negotiations with the USSR on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact was envisaged. main meaning The proposals of supporters of preparations for a future war with the Soviet Union was to first create a powerful military-economic base in Manchuria and conquer all of China. Rejecting the collective measures proposed by the USSR to curb the Japanese interventionists, the Western powers sought to push the Soviet Union into independent action against Japan, referring to the fact that it was China's neighbor. During the Brussels Conference, Western representatives stated in an apparently provocative manner that "the best way to make Japan more accommodating would be to send several hundred Soviet aircraft to scare Tokyo." It was obvious that the involvement of the USSR in the Sino-Japanese war was viewed by the Western powers as best development events, because this would mean diverting Japan's attention from Central and South China. On December 29, Chiang Kai-shek raised the question of sending Soviet military specialists, weapons, vehicles, artillery and other technical means to China before the government of the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the fulfillment of this request created the danger of worsening Soviet-Japanese relations, the Soviet leadership decided to provide direct assistance to the Chinese people.
The goals and objectives of Japan's war against the USSR were originally set out in the document "Basic Principles of the Plan for Leading the War against the Soviet Union" developed in August 1936 by the General Staff of the Army. In it, in the event of a major war with the USSR, it was envisaged at its first stage to "capture Primorye (the right coast of the Ussuri and Amur) and Northern Sakhalin" and "force the Soviet Union to agree to the construction of the Great Mongolian State." The operational plan of 1937 provided for an offensive from three directions - east, north and west. The most important task was declared to be the rapid "destruction of the Trans-Siberian Railway in the Baikal region in order to cut the main transport artery connecting European part USSR with Siberia. On July 29, Japanese troops, taking advantage of the numerical superiority, invaded the territory of the USSR. Soviet army telegram requesting "immediate start of diplomatic negotiations", stating that japanese army has already "demonstrated its power ... and as long as there is a choice, you need to stop." This decision was also supported by the fact that, following the order from Moscow, units of the Special Far Eastern Army did not develop an offensive deep into Manchuria, demonstrating their desire to avoid expanding the conflict. It was known in Moscow that the Japanese provocation in the region of Lake Khasan was primarily aimed at "intimidating the USSR" and that the Japanese were currently big war with the Soviet Union are not ready. Therefore, when, through the embassy in Moscow, the Japanese government requested a cessation of hostilities, agreeing to the restoration of the violated border, the Soviet government saw fit to respond positively. Having been defeated, the Japanese, however, partially achieved the goals of provocation, demonstrated to the Western powers their intention to continue confrontation with the USSR and became convinced of the “desire of the Soviet government to avoid direct involvement of the Soviet Union in the Sino-Japanese war. According to the calculations of the Japanese leadership, the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Union should have pushed Germany to agree with the Japanese position. On May 19, 1939, the Soviet government protested to Japan in connection with the gross violation of the border of the allied Mongolian People's Republic and demanded an end to hostilities. Soviet troops, including the eleventh tank brigade, were hastily sent to the border. However, the Japanese command continued to implement the plan of the planned operation.
Tensions in Soviet-Japanese relations, which peaked in the summer of 1939 during the conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River, eased with the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact in August 1939, focusing on expansion to the south, which implied a clash with the United States, Japan was interested in stabilization relations with the USSR. Such stabilization was possible either through the accession of the Soviet Union to the Tripartite Pact, or through a separate Soviet-Japanese agreement on the delimitation of spheres of influence in the zone of direct contact between the interests of Japan and the USSR, similar to what existed between the USSR and Germany. It was, first of all, about Manchuria, Mongolia and the zone of the Sea of Japan. The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, however, did not fully meet these goals. First, it did not contain sufficiently strong guarantees regarding the mutual renunciation of the parties from unfriendly actions. Secondly, the mutual recognition of the interests of the USSR in Mongolia and Japan in Manchukuo, fixed by a special protocol, was far from the radical agreement on the division of spheres of influence that was originally intended. Moreover, the parties were forced to agree to signing a neutrality pact, and not a Soviet-German non-aggression pact, precisely because they failed to agree on a number of key territorial issues. However, the demands proposed by Japan in 1941 formed the basis of the Soviet position on the territorial issue in 1945 in the territorial settlement with Japan. At the same time, having obtained recognition from Tokyo of its predominance in Mongolia, the USSR was able to act more freely from its territory in relation to China. Bound by a treaty with the government of Chiang Kai-shek, the Soviet Union supported China in its resistance to Japanese aggression. He provided China with a loan, which was used to supply tanks, aircraft, military equipment and fuel. However, after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the amount of this assistance was reduced.
The principal agreements regarding East Asia boiled down to the following. First, the USSR undertook to start a war against Japan no later than three months after the victory over Germany. Secondly, the United States and Great Britain recognized the status quo in the Far East in terms of the existence of Outer Mongolia as an entity de facto independent of China. Thirdly, there was a consensus on the return of South Sakhalin to the Soviet Union and the transfer of the Kuril Islands to it. Moreover, if South Sakhalin was really acquired by Japan as a result of aggression during the Russo-Japanese War, then the Kuril Islands became part of the Japanese Empire long before that on the basis of the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1875 with Russia in exchange for Sakhalin Island. In this sense, the principle proclaimed by the Allies of depriving Japan of territories acquired by it as a result of "violence and greed", as stipulated by the Cairo Declaration, could not be applied to them. Fourthly, the USA and Great Britain recognized the need to restore the conditions for the participation of the USSR in the operation of railways in Manchuria "with the provision of the predominant interests of the Soviet Union." This vague formulation caused a lot of controversy in the future. It allowed the Soviet side to broadly interpret the Yalta agreements as recognition of the right of the USSR to restore the entire scope of rights and privileges that Russia once enjoyed in the CER zone, despite the fact that the restoration of such a regime meant significant withdrawals from China's sovereign rights in Manchuria, the restoration of which the United States and Britain guaranteed Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo.
There is no doubt that one of the main reasons for the large-scale armed provocation in the region of Lake Khasan was the desire of the Japanese military to “intimidate” the Soviet leadership with their might. imperial army, to force him to reconsider his policy towards China, to prevent the USSR from being involved in the Sino-Japanese war. At that time, the Japanese were not ready for war with the USSR. August 3, 1938 Resident Soviet intelligence in Japan, Richard Sorge conveyed to Moscow: “... The Japanese General Staff is interested in a war with the USSR not now, but later. Active actions on the border were taken by the Japanese to show the Soviet Union that Japan was still able to show its power. In general, in exchange for the obligation to enter the war against Japan, the USSR actually achieved the acceptance by the United States and Great Britain of their conditions in full. At the same time, these conditions themselves turned out to be more moderate than both the Western partners of the USSR and China itself expected. The Soviet Union did not go beyond the requirement to leave Mongolia in its sphere of influence and agreed to recognize the sovereignty of Chiang Kai-shek over Manchuria after the expulsion of Japanese troops from there. Throughout 1941-1945, the Soviet Union was forced to keep at least forty divisions on its Far Eastern borders. As long as the second hotbed of war and aggression continued to exist, imperialist Japan, the USSR could not consider its security assured in the Far East. The defeat of Nazi Germany and the unconditional surrender of its armed forces in May 1945, as well as the successes of the Anglo-American troops in the Pacific Ocean, forced the Japanese government to begin preparations for defense.
On July 26, the USSR, the USA and China demanded from Japan unconditional surrender. The request was rejected. On August 8, the USSR announced that from the next day it considered itself at war with Japan. By that time, troops deployed from the Soviet-German front were deployed on the border with Manchuria. As its main goal in the military campaign in the Far East, the USSR determined the defeat of the main striking force Japan - the Kwantung Army and the liberation from the Japanese invaders of the northeastern provinces of China (Manchuria) and North Korea. This was to have a decisive effect on accelerating the surrender of Japan and ensuring the defeat of Japanese troops in South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. By the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet armed forces, the total strength of the strategic grouping of Japanese ground forces located in Manchuria, Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was 1.2 million people, about 1200 tanks, 5400 guns and up to 1800 aircraft. To defeat the strong Kwantung Army in May-June 1945, the Soviet command transferred 27 rifle divisions, seven rifle and tank brigades, 1 tank and 2 mechanized corps to 40 divisions in the Far East. As a result, the combat strength of the Red Army troops in the Far East almost doubled, amounting to more than 1.5 million people, 26,000 guns and mortars, more than 5,500 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, and about 3,800 combat aircraft. Ships of the Pacific Fleet were also to take part in military operations against militaristic Japan.
The main forces of the Trans-Baikal Front (commander Marshal R.Ya. Malinovsky) struck from the direction of Transbaikalia from the territory of the MPR in the general direction of Changchun and Mukden. The troops of this front were to reach the central regions of Northeast China, cross the waterless steppe, and then overcome the Khingan mountain range. Troops of the First Far Eastern Front (Commander Marshal K.A. Meretskov) advanced from Primorye in the direction of Girin. This front went along the shortest direction to join with the main grouping of the Trans-Baikal Front. The Second Far Eastern Front (commanded by General M.A. Purkaev), which went on the offensive in the Amur region, was supposed to tie down the Japanese troops opposing it with strikes in a number of directions, thereby contributing to the successful solution of the task of encircling the main forces of the Kwantung Army by the Transbaikal and the first Far Eastern fronts. The actions of the ground forces were to be actively supported by air strikes and amphibious assaults from the ships of the Pacific Fleet. At the same time, Soviet troops continued to liberate the northeastern regions of China and North Korea from the Japanese invaders. At the same time, the liberation of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands continued (until September 1). By the end of August 1945, the disarmament of the Kwantung Army and the army of the puppet state of Manchukuo was fully completed, as well as the liberation of Manchuria, the Liaodong Peninsula and North Korea up to the 38th parallel. Japan surrendered unconditionally. At the Harbin airfield, paratroopers captured the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, General H. Khata, who was given an ultimatum by Major General G. Shelakhov, especially authorized by the military council of the front, on the immediate surrender of the Kwantung Army. The situation near Harbin was complicated by the fact that the troops of the first front of the Kwantung Army, who were defeated in the border battles, retreated here, and in the vicinity of the city, the Teixintai shock detachments, sabotage groups of suicide bombers and lone fanatics operated. The main part of the Harbin grouping of the enemy was disarmed, but sabotage groups of suicide bombers still remained and were actively operating, causing considerable harm to the Soviet troops. They revived the samurai tactic of "kesshi" (willingness to die). This suicidal tactic of the Japanese suicide bombers was experienced, and more than once, by Soviet soldiers. One day in September 1945, while patrolling the outskirts of Harbin on the armor of the "thirty-four", Semyon Sergeevich Rylov involuntarily drew attention to a large stirring kaoliang bush. Rylov pushed his comrade sitting next to him with his elbow, look, they say ... What was the surprise of the paratroopers when the "bush" jumped to its feet, grabbed a bunch of grenades and with a wild cry "Banzai !!!" rushed to the tank. Automatic bursts stopped the samurai just a few meters from the "thirty-four". The head of the murdered man, who never fulfilled his mission, was tied with a strip of white cloth with hieroglyphs applied to it.
The paratroopers have more than once encountered Japanese suicides. They tried to destroy our high-ranking officers with knives, sneaked up on groups of soldiers and officers in order to blow themselves up in the crowd, tied themselves with explosives and grenades, threw themselves under tanks and vehicles, but thanks to the vigilance and high professionalism of the paratroopers, the samurai failed to complete their mission. The military campaign of the Soviet armed forces in the Far East was victoriously completed. On September 2, 1945, the Japanese Surrender Act was signed aboard the USS Missouri in the waters of Tokyo Bay. On behalf of the allies, representatives of the United States, China, Great Britain and the USSR, as well as Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands and New Zealand signed. As a result of the victory of the USSR over parts of the Japanese Kwantung Army, Japan returned the southern part of Sakhalin to the Soviet Union. The Kuril Islands also went to the USSR. The American occupying forces remained in Japan.
The Tokyo trial of the main Japanese war criminals took place in Tokyo from May 3, 1946 to November 12, 1948 at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, established on January 19, 1946 in accordance with an agreement between the governments of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and a number of other countries that accepted participation in the war with Japan. Former prime ministers, ministers, ambassadors, representatives of the highest generals of the Japanese army (28 people in total) were put on trial. In the verdict in the case of Japanese war criminals, it was noted that in the pre-war and war years, the external and domestic politics Japan was aimed at preparing and unleashing aggressive wars. The Japanese militarists, together with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, sought to win world domination, to enslave the peoples of China, the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and other states. A special place in these plans was occupied by the seizure of the Far Eastern territories of the USSR. The Tokyo Trials, like the Nuremberg Trials that preceded it, which condemned not only specific individuals, but also aggression as the gravest crime, were essential for the establishment of principles and norms international law. The agreements at Yalta were secret.
So Thus, the Kwantung Army was attacked by land, air and sea along the entire vast five thousandth stretch of the border with Manchuria and along the coast of North Korea. Already on the sixth day of the offensive, by the end of August 14, 1945, the Trans-Baikal and the First Far Eastern Fronts advanced 150-500 km deep into Manchuria, and reached all the main military-political and industrial centers. In the face of imminent defeat, on August 14 the Japanese government decided to capitulate. However, despite this, the Kwantung Army continued stubborn resistance, because, despite the message of the Japanese emperor about the surrender, the order to the command of the Kwantung Army to cease hostilities was never given. Nevertheless, in response to the demands of the Soviet command for the surrender of Japanese troops in Manchuria, on August 19, units of the Kwantung Army nevertheless ceased hostilities and began to surrender their weapons.
Throughout World War II, the Kuomintang armies did not actually conduct combat operations against Japan; armed struggle took place only on the fronts of the 8th and 4th New People's Liberation Armies. By 1944, the number of regular troops led by the CPC had reached 910,000. There were 2.2 million people in the people's militia units. The 8th and 4th New PLA repulsed numerous campaigns of Japanese and puppet troops; by April 1945, there were 19 liberated regions in China with a population exceeding 95 million people. These armies pinned down most of the Japanese military in China - 64 percent of the Japanese and 95 percent of the puppet government's troops.
The Japanese command at the end of March 1944 launched the largest offensive during the war in China. Operations were conducted against the Kuomintang troops and aimed at occupying the entire coast of China, pushing the Kuomintang inland. By establishing a direct land connection from Singapore to Northeast China, the Japanese strategists completely eliminated the consequences of the naval blockade established by the US and British fleets. The consequences of all this would be very significant, as D. F. Dulles admitted: “The Japanese accumulated a large amount of military materials in Northeast China, hoping that they would be able to continue the war on the mainland, even if the islands themselves were lost.” The Japanese offensive lasted almost a year and was crowned with success. The Kuomintang armies were defeated, losing from 700 thousand to 1 million people. The Japanese connected their fronts in Central and South China, creating a wide corridor along the coast. They occupied the Chinese provinces with an area of about 2 million square meters. km with a population of 60 million people.
During the advance, Japanese troops captured 10 major air bases and 36 airfields. These bases were created with great difficulty by the Americans, during the retreat they had to abandon and burn the property available on them, and in order to deliver one ton of cargo to them, the Americans spent three tons of fuel; the only way China's supply passed by air, through the Himalayas. The unheard-of catastrophe in China overturned the entire Anglo-American strategy in the war in the Far East.
Combat operations in Burma developed extremely sluggishly throughout the war, and in March-April 1944, Japanese troops, with a sudden blow, threatened the Allied communications in Northern Burma. Further deterioration of the situation was avoided only as a result of the fact that the allied command finally allowed the arming of the Burmese partisans. Until then, Britain and the United States were afraid to give arms to the Burmese people. By the joint actions of the allied forces and the anti-Japanese resistance forces in Burma, led by the anti-fascist People's Liberation League, the Japanese troops were expelled from Burma by May 1945. However, success in this theater was of a local nature and by no means undermined the forces of the Japanese ground army. There was also no weakening of the will of the Japanese armed forces in the struggle. On the contrary, after more than three years of war, Japanese soldiers, as the enemy approached the Japanese islands, fought with even greater ferocity.
The American commanders in the Pacific saw no way to achieve victory over Japan before the end of 1946. In the final battles against her, the upcoming losses were estimated at a million people. MacArthur firmly told Naval Minister Forrestal that the help of at least 60 Soviet divisions was needed to defeat Japan. Many years later, in 1949, even Secretary of State Acheson frankly admitted: "The main concern of the American government was" to achieve the early entry of the Soviet Union into the war with Japan so that the Japanese army, concentrated in Manchuria, could not return to their home islands in critical moment." Truman wrote, "As our troops moved forward in the Pacific, paying with great blood each step, the entry of Russia into the war became more urgent. It meant saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans."